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ii
sABSTRACT
Kanat Abdulla: The Allocation of Talent in Brazil and India
(Under the direction of Lutz Hendricks)
ss
This dissertation is a collection of two independent essays on human capital in
developing countries. In the first chapter, I investigate the labor market outcomes in
Brazil and India and examine the effect of the frictions in the human capital accumulation
and in the labor market on the aggregate output in these countries. The second chapter
tests theories related to immigrant characteristics and their earnings by investigating
immigrants in low-income countries.
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Chapter 1
THE ALLOCATION OF TALENT IN BRAZIL AND INDIA
1.1 Introduction
Hsieh et al. (2013) ask whether improved allocation of workers according to their
talents was an important source of productivity growth in the U.S. This is motivated by
substantial differences in occupational choices between men/women and blacks/whites.
In particular, they document that the share of women and blacks in high-skill occupations
was very low relative to that of white men. These differences in occupational distribution
of women and blacks relative to white men declined over time, suggesting that misal-
location has diminished. This change has positively affected the aggregate productivity
growth in the United States. Hsieh et al. (2013) argue that better allocation of talent
explains 15–20% of the economic growth in the U.S.
I use micro-level survey data from Brazil and India with detailed information on
socio-economic and occupational characteristics and their earnings to investigate the role
of allocation of talent in economic development of these countries. The analysis in these
countries is motivated by the fact that there are substantial fractions of the population
that are disadvantaged in terms of access to quality education and jobs. As a result there
are large differences in occupational distribution and earnings between groups. This paper
will argue that the allocation of talent affects the aggregate output in these countries.
Allocation of talent refers to the distribution of various groups across occupations,
where the groups are categorized by race1 and gender. Talent is misallocated when there
is a difference in the occupational distribution between the groups. The main forces
1In India the groups are categorized by castes.
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that produce the difference in occupational distribution across groups are frictions in
accumulation of human capital and frictions in labor market. Frictions are estimated from
the observed occupational distributions and the wage gap between groups. Given these
frictions, workers choose occupations where they have the highest utility. An augmented
Roy model of occupational choice developed by Hsieh et al. (2013) allows me to determine
the potential gains to output from decreasing frictions in Brazil and India.
I investigate the occupational distribution and wage gaps of four groups (white men,
white women, brown men and brown women) in Brazil and four groups (other men, other
women, scheduled caste/tribe men, scheduled caste/tribe women) in India. The term
“brown” is used to refer to Brazilians of mixed ethnic ancestries and sometimes known
as “parda” in the Brazilian censuses. Browns make up 43% of the Brazilian population.
Scheduled caste and tribe are terms recognized by the Indian constitution and refer to
the most disadvantaged groups in India. They consist of 26% of the country’s population.
I show that frictions are substantial, especially for brown women in Brazil and
scheduled caste women in India. I conduct a counterfactual experiment which helps me to
assess the role of misallocation of talent in productivity in these countries. First, I reduce
frictions faced by the groups by half. I find that reducing frictions faced by various groups
in Brazil and India by half increases the aggregate productivity by 10–20% in Brazil and
by 14–22% in India. Second, I investigate the gain after eliminating frictions in these
countries. Removing frictions increases the aggregate productivity of the countries by
21–42% in Brazil and by 36–46% in India.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 1.2 reviews the literature, Section 1.3
describes the census data obtained from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series,
Section 1.4 discusses the model, Section 1.5 provides an empirical evidence on earnings
of various groups and their occupational distribution, Section 1.6 describes the results of
the model and provides robustness checks, and Section 1.7 concludes.
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1.2 Literature review
In most countries there are disadvantaged groups within population. They are
disadvantaged because they face discrimination in the early stages of acquisition of human
capital or later face unequal access to jobs or both. Brazil and India are among those
countries.
There is significant evidence that in Brazil there is a gap in earnings between men
and women and race groups. Men in Brazil earn about 25% more and are more likely to
participate in the labor force than women in Brazil (Arabsheibani et al. (2003)). White
people in Brazil earn 26% more than brown people with same human capital and labor
market characteristics (Telles (2006)). A significant part of the racial wage gap in Brazil
occurs because of discrimination (Lovell (1993)). The analysis of the returns to schooling
for various groups shows that the returns to schooling for whites are higher than the
returns to schooling for dark-skinned population (Loureiro et al. (2004)). The difference
in occupational distribution between men and women in Brazil has an effect on wage gap
between these groups (Madalozzo R. (2010)).
Caste- and gender-based discrimination in India produces significant gaps in terms
of earnings and labor market participation. Scheduled caste and scheduled tribe workers
earn 30% less than equally qualified others (Madheswaran and Attewell (2007)). The
unconditional earnings gap of women relative to men in India was 55% in 1999–2000 and
49% in 2009–2010, and the gap persists even within the same education level and within
most occupations and industries (Deshpande et al. (2018)). Occupational discrimina-
tion is more prevalent than wage discrimination. Some castes are discriminated against
in terms of unequal access to jobs, especially in the private sector (Madheswaran and
Attewell (2007)). Discrimination in hiring processes is a common practice in the urban
labor market in India (Thorat and Attewell (2007)).
The observed gaps in earnings and unequal access to jobs force individuals from cer-
3
tain groups out of occupations for which they have necessary skills. This is called talent
misallocation. Whether or not this misallocation has an effect on overall productivity has
been the focus of a number of studies that have contributed to the understanding of the
role of talent misallocation in economic development. One of the important factors in
the allocation of talent is the relative rewards that different professions receive (Acemoglu
(1995)). Rewards for entrepreneurship determine the allocation of productive versus un-
productive entrepreneurship labor, which affects the aggregate output (Baumol (1990)).
By analyzing the occupational distribution of women and blacks relative to white men in
the period from 1960 to 2008, Hsieh et al. (2013) find that the share of women and blacks
in high-skill occupations was very low relative to that of white men in the 1960s. This
occupational gap shrank over time, affecting aggregate productivity growth in the United
States. In particular, Hsieh et al. (2013) argue that better allocation of talent explains
15–20% of the economic growth in the U.S.
1.3 Data
I use Brazilian and Indian survey data available at Integrated Public Use Microdata
Series (IPUMS). The Brazilian data spans the 1991, 2000, and 2010 survey years with
a total sample size of about 5–10 million individuals per survey year. Indian data is a
socio-economic survey conducted by the National Sample Survey Organization of India
every 5–6 years with a sample size of 500–600 thousand individuals. The variable names,
coding schemes, and documentation are consistent for most samples.
The analysis uses a variable from IPUMS that indicates an individual’s primary
occupation, which is classified according to the system used by the respective census of
countries. Brazilian and Indian surveys have different classification systems for occupa-
tions. Moreover, the Brazilian survey has varying classifications for different periods. To
make data comparable across years and countries, I harmonize occupational coding to the
1990 Census occupational classification system used by Hsieh et al. (2013) and aggregate
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to 66 occupations.2 Some related occupation categories were merged into one sub-heading.
For instance, management-related occupations include some administrative support occu-
pations, and the computer and communications equipment operator occupation consists of
communication equipment operators and computer and peripheral equipment operators.
Other key variables used in the analysis are variables indicating an individual’s
earnings, hours worked, employment status, education, and race. For individual’s earnings
I use a variable that represents the total income from the labor (from wages, a business,
or a farm) in the previous month or year.3 A variable that indicates individual’s social
group or race in Brazilian census is named as “race” and in Indian census as “social group”.
Employment status of the person is defined by Emptat, which I use to identify employed
individuals. Hrswork4 shows a person’s hours worked per week, and wkswork4 shows
person’s weeks worked per year, which are used to compute hourly wages. A person’s
educational attainment is identified by the variable “edattaind” and shows the person’s
educational attainment in terms of the level of schooling completed, i.e. a person attending
the final year of college receives the code for having completed secondary degree only.
From this variable I construct a variable that indicates a person’s number of schooling
years completed, “educ”. There is a limitation in constructing years of schooling from
edattaind because it will show only the approximate number of years of schooling. For
example, there is a discontinuity between 8 and 12 years of schooling, and it will not allow
me to identify individuals with more than 16 years of schooling.
From the available data I construct hourly wages and experience. Hourly wages are
constructed from income, weeks worked per year and hours worked per week. Experi-
ence is constructed from individual’s age and years of schooling completed as age minus
schooling minus 6. As I discussed previously, there is a problem in the recording years of
2The detailed occupational coding is provided in Appendix.
3The variable available in IPUMS for Brazil and India is called “incearn”. I also use data from the
US in analysis. For the US sample I use “incbus”, income from business, “incwage”, wage income, and
“incfarm”, income from farming.
4The variables “wkswork” and “hrswork” are available only for Brazil and US.
5
schooling correctly for some observations, which leads to difficulty in recording the poten-
tial experience for some observations. It may overstate the actual potential experience if
actual years of schooling is higher and understate if the actual years of schooling is lower.
Summary statistics for key variables used in the analysis are provided in Appendix
Table A3.
1.3.1 Data from Brazilian household survey
The data are analyzed for the following sample periods: 1991, 2000, and 2010. The
following restrictions are made to the data: 1) only brown5 and white are chosen out of
5 possible race groups, 2) the analysis is restricted to individuals whose ages are between
25 and 60, 3) individuals who are on active military duty and unemployed individuals are
excluded, 4) individuals who are unable to work due to disability, retired or at school are
also excluded from the sample.
Table 1.1 reports the summary statistics of the restricted sample across years. The
number of observations, as shown in the table, has increased considerably over time, with
the sample size increasing two-fold from 969,000 observations to 1,530,000 observations
over the 20-year period. The largest share of the sample belong to whites: the share of
whites was 59% in 1991 and 55% in 2010. The shares of race groups have not changed
much over the course of the period. White males and females constituted 28% and 30%
of the population and 26% and 28% of the population in 1991 and 2010, respectively.
The proportions of brown men and brown females have slightly increased from 21% to
23%, respectively, over the period. The education levels of these population have changed
significantly over the 20-year period. Table A4 in Appendix reports the share of college-
educated individuals by groups and survey years. In 1991 the share of college-educated
individuals was only 5.5% of the total population, but in 2010 it had increased to 10.4%.
5In the analysis I use only brown and white because these races constitute the largest share of the
population, and the US has also two largest race groups, namely black and white, which makes comparison
with the US easier.
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Among the race groups, brown men had the fewest college-educated individuals: in 1991
the share of college-educated brown men was only 1.8% of the total brown men, in 2010 it
had increased only to 3.8%. White women in the sample show the highest increase in the
share of college-educated individuals. In the total population the share of college-educated
white women was 7.7% in 1991; by 2010 it had increased to 17.1%.
1991 2000 2010
Sample size 969,833 1,204,718 1,531,081
white men 28% 29% 26%
white women 30% 32% 28%
brown men 21% 20% 23%
brown women 21% 20% 23%
Table 1.1: Sample statistics (Brazilian survey)
1.3.2 Data from Indian household survey
For India, IPUMS provides consistent data for the following sample periods: 1993,
1999, and 2004. There is a lack of data comparability across different survey periods in
regard to caste identities. In the 1999 and 2004 surveys, other backward castes are treated
separately; however prior to 1999 other backward castes and others were treated as one
group. For the purposes of comparability across different periods, I treat other backward
castes and others as one group in the 1999 and 2004 sample periods.
The following restrictions are made to the data: 1) the analysis is restricted to
individuals aged 25–60, 2) individuals who are on active military duty and unemployed
individuals are excluded, 3) individuals who are unable to work due to disability, retired,
or at school are also excluded from the sample.
There are four main caste classifications: scheduled caste, scheduled tribe, other
backward castes, and others. The most disadvantaged castes in socio-economic terms
are scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. Table 1.2 reports the summary statistics of
the samples. The sample size does not change much across periods: 244,514, 256,948 and
269,067 in 1993, 1999 and 2004, respectively. The majority of the Indian population in the
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sample are “others” with 72–75% of the total population. Scheduled tribes and scheduled
castes are minority groups of the Indian population. They respectively comprise 13%
and 16% of India’s total population in the sample. The share of castes did not show
appreciable change over time.
The majority of the Indian working population have education levels less than college
degree. As shown in Table A4, only 6.8% and 7.8% of the total population had a college
degree in 1999 and 2004, respectively. There is diversity in terms of education attainment
among gender and castes. While 11.5% of other men had a college degree in 1999, the
share of college-educated other women was only 5.5%. This is also true for other castes.
Only 1.2 and 0.5% of scheduled tribe and scheduled caste women had college degrees in
1991 as compared to 3.5% and 2.5% of men from respective castes. We see an increase in
college attainment for all castes. Overtime the groups experienced increase in the share
of college-educated individuals. In particular, scheduled tribe and scheduled caste men
show a noticeable increase in the share of college educated individuals, from 3.5% to 7%
and from 2.5% to 5.1%, respectively, in 1993 and 2004.
1993 1999 2004
Sample size 244,514 256,948 269,067
Other men 38% 37% 35%
Other women 38% 37% 36%
Scheduled tribe men 5% 5% 6%
Scheduled tribe women 5% 6% 7%
Scheduled caste men 7% 8% 8%
Scheduled caste women 7% 8% 8%
Table 1.2: Sample statistics (Indian survey)
1.3.3 Home sector and sample selection
A substantial part of the working population in developing countries is occupied
in the informal sector. Taking into account this sector will greatly influence the results.
IPUMS provides information about the employment status of individuals in the sample.
Individuals not in the labor force are classified as being in housework, unable to work,
8
at school, or retired and living on rents. Table A5 in Appendix shows the observation
numbers in each category. The sample excludes individuals who are at school, unable to
work or retired. So individuals in labor force and individuals not in labor force but those
in housework are in the sample. As can be seen from Table 1.3, approximately 1/3 of
the working age population in Brazil and India are classified as employed in housework.
Most of the population occupied in housework in both countries are women: 40.8% of
women in Brazil in 2010 and 60.5% of women in India in 2004 were classified as working
in housework. For men this number is much lower: 15.7% in Brazil and 3.8% in India in
the corresponding years.
1991 2000 2010
Total 964,173 1,204,520 1,530,715
All Employed 71% 70% 72%Housework 29% 30% 28%
Men Employed 99.8% 88% 84%Housework 0.2% 11.7% 15.7%
Women Employed 42.7% 51.8% 59.2%Housework 57.3% 48.2% 40.8%
(a) Brazil
1993 1999 2004
Total 251,690 266,404 275,405
All Employed 66% 65% 68%Housework 34% 35% 32%
Men Employed 96.2% 95% 96%Housework 3.8% 4.6% 3.8%
Women Employed 36.0% 34.5% 39.5%Housework 64.0% 65.5% 60.5%
(b) India
Table 1.3: Sample data
In addition to the 66 occupation categories defined above, I create another occu-
pational category for the home sector. An individual who is not in the labor force is
considered to be working in the home sector. I impute wages for individuals in the home
sector by assigning them the predicted wages of people in the market sector with the
9
same observed characteristics. The observed characteristics include the region where an
individual resides, the group to which individual belongs, schooling, and experience. Here
I assume that the relationship between earnings and these characteristics are the same
for the home and the market sectors.
Estimating the wage equation for individuals who are employed may not produce
similar results to estimating it for the population as a whole. Those who are employed are
the ones who made the decision to work, but this decision may not have been made ran-
domly. If the ones who choose to work tend to have higher (lower) wages than those not
in the labor force, then the sample of observed wages will be biased upward (downward).
Thus this produces a biased result when estimating the returns to observable charac-
teristics like education or experience. To assign wages to workers in the home sector, I
implement selection bias correction, following Heckman (1979).
Thus the following model is analyzed:
log(wage) = β1+β2group+β3educ+β4exp
+β5exp2+β6year+β7region+β8marst+ ε1
(1.1)
and the earnings are observed if
γ1+γ2group+γ3educ+γ4exp+γ5exp2
+γ6year+γ7region+γ8marst+γ9numperson+ ε2 > 0
(1.2)
I assume that Xi includes education and experience, dummy variables for groups,
census region, year, and marital status, and Zi includes variables in Xi plus the number
of people in the household.6 The model is estimated on women. Using the estimated
unbiased coefficients, I predict the earnings for women in the home sector.
6The studies use the number of children as an exclusion restriction (e.g. Mulligan and Rubinstein
(2008)). For Brazil and India this variable is not available.
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1.4 The Model
I use an augmented Roy (1951) model presented by Hsieh et al. (2013). There are an
infinite number of individuals and a representative firm. Individuals consume goods, rent
labor to maximize their utilities, and choose occupation that deliver the highest utility.
A firm hires labor inputs and produces goods.
Demographics: There is a continuum of people, each belonging to a group g based
on gender and race.
Preferences: Individuals maximize their utility:
Uig = cβig(1− sig) (1.3)
where i refers to occupation, cig is consumption, sig schooling, and β is a parameter
showing the tradeoff between consumption and leisure.
Endowments: At birth, individuals are endowed with a random skill i from a
extreme value distribution as in McFadden (1974) and Eaton and Kortum (2002).
Fg(1, ..., N ) = exp{−[
N∑
i=1
(Tig−θi )]1−ρ} (1.4)
where θ determines the skill dispersion, ρ determines the correlation of skills across occu-
pations, and Tig defines occupation-group specific ability.
Technology: An individual accumulates human capital from education s and ex-
penditure e according to the production function:
h(e,s) = h¯igsφiig e
η
ig (1.5)
The production function varies by group. The elasticity of human capital with
respect to schooling, φi, differs by occupation. The parameter h¯ig, efficiency in human
capital, differs across groups and occupations, which allows for differences in health and
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family background.
Markets: There is a market for labor rental.
1.4.1 Household Problem
Households maximize their utility by choosing consumption, schooling, and expen-
diture on goods:
U(τwig , τhig, h¯ig,wi, i) =maxc,e,s (1− sig)c
β
ig (1.6)
s.t.
cig = (1− τwig)wiih(eig, sig)eig(1+ τhig) (1.7)
Budget constraint relates consumption to income and expenditure. wi is the wage
per efficiency unit of labor paid by the firm, and i is an idiosyncratic talent draw in the
worker’s chosen occupation. There are two additional variables: τhig, friction on accumula-
tion of human capital, and τwig , friction in labor market. τhig acts like a tax on expenditure
on human capital and τwig acts like a tax on wages in the labor market.
Household solution is {c∗ig, e∗ig, s∗ig} and Uig that satisfy:
s∗i =
1
1+ 1−ηβφi
(1.8)
e∗ig = (
ηwis
φi
i i
τig
)
1
1−η (1.9)
c∗ig = η¯(
wis
φi
i i
τig
)
1
1−η (1.10)
U(τig,wi, i) = (
wis
φi
i (1− si)
1−η
β iη
η(1−η)1−η
τig
)
β
1−η (1.11)
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Here, τig summarizes the frictions such that:
τig =
(1+ τhig)η
1− τwig
× 1
h¯ig
(1.12)
Occupational Sorting
Given skills, an individual will choose the occupation that yields the highest value
of Uig in equation (1.11). By aggregating the optimal occupation choices for all people,
we arrive at the following equation, which is the overall occupational share of a group g7:
pig =
w˜θig∑N
s=1 w˜
θ
sg
(1.13)
where w˜ig =
T
1/θ
ig wis
φi
i (1−si)
1−η
β
τig
and pig is the fraction of people in group g that work in
occupation i. Equation (1.13) says that the occupational sorting depends on w˜ig, which
is the overall reward that someone from group g working in occupation i who has mean
talents receives, relative to the power mean of w˜ for the group over all occupations.
This means that the occupational distribution is driven by the relative reward, not the
absolute reward, for working in an occupation. This sorting model generates an equation
for average quality of workers in a given group working in a given occupation:
E[higi] = γ[ηηsφii (
wi(1− τwig)
1+ τhig
)η(Tig
pig
)
1
θ ]
1
1−η (1.14)
where γ =Γ(1− 1θ(1−ρ) 11−η ) is related to the mean of the Frechet distribution for abilities.
The average quality of worker in a group g and occupation i is inversely related to the
share of that group in that occupation. This means that if the share of a group is small in
a certain occupation, the workers representing that group working in that occupation will
be of a higher quality on average than the workers representing other groups working in
7The derivation of the result can be found in Hsieh et al. (2013)
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the same occupation. This can be explained by the fact that if a group faces high barriers
in a certain occupation, the people from that group who succeed in that occupation must
be highly skilled. Given that we have average quality of workers we can derive the average
wage for a given group in a given occupation:
w¯ig = (1− τwig)wiE[higi] = (1− si)−1/βγη¯(
N∑
s
w˜θsg)
1
θ
1
1−η (1.15)
where w¯ig is the average earnings in occupation i by group g and η¯ = η
η
1−η .
The occupational wage gap between any two groups is given by:
w¯ig
w¯ig′
= (
∑
s w˜
θ
sg∑
s w˜
θ
sg′
)
1
θ
1
1−η (1.16)
Equation (1.16) shows that the wage gap between group g and group g′, w¯igw¯ig′ , is
independent of occupations. Combining equation (1.13) and equation (1.16), we get the
propensity of a group g to work in an occupation relative to group g′:
( pig
pig′
) =
Tig′
Tig
( τig
τig′
)−θ( w¯g
w¯g′
)−θ(1−η) (1.17)
where w¯g = (
∑N
i w˜
θ
ig)
1
θ
1
1−η−1∑N
i w˜
θ
ig(1− si)−
1
β γη¯ is the average wage of the group. From
equation (1.17) we can see that the propensity for a member of a group g to work in an
occupation i compared to group g′ is affected by three factors: the relative mean talent
Tig′
Tig
, the relative frictions τigτig′ , and the wage gap
w¯g
w¯g′
. The propensity for a group to work
in an occupation is increasing in relative mean talent and decreasing in relative frictions
and the relative wage gap.
1.4.2 Firm problem
A representative firm produces aggregate output Y from labor in N different oc-
cupations by hiring Hi, total efficiency labor units, in each occupation and taking Ai,
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exogenous productivity in occupation i, as given in order to maximize profits:
max
Hi
(Y−
N∑
i=1
wiHi) (1.18)
where aggregate output, Y , is given by:
Y = (
N∑
i=1
(AiHi)
σ−1
σ )
σ
σ−1 (1.19)
Firm solution:
Hdemandi = (
A
σ−1
σ
i
wi
)σY (1.20)
1.4.3 Market clearing
Wage per efficiency unit of labor, wi, clears the labor market in each occupation:
Hdemandi =H
supply
i (1.21)
where Hsupplyi , aggregate supply is given by:
Hsupplyi =
∑
g
qgpigE[higi]
= γη¯wθ−1i (1− si)(θ(1−η)−1)/βsθφii
∑
g
qgTig
(1−τwig)θ−1
(1+τhig)ηθ
(
N∑
i=1
w˜θsg)
1
θ
1
1−η−1
(1.22)
where qg is the total number of people in group g.
1.4.4 General equilibrium
General equilibrium consists of {pig,Hsupplyi , Hdemandi , wi} and Y that:
1. pig satisfies equation 1.13;
2. Hsupplyi satisfies equation 1.22;
3. Hdemandi satisfies equation 1.20;
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4. wi satisfies equation 1.21;
5. Y satisfies equation 1.19.
1.5 Empirical findings
As the model predicts in equation (1.17), frictions faced by each group can be derived
from the wage gap and occupational distribution of the group relative to the privileged
group. Here I estimate wage gaps between groups relative to the privileged group and
occupational distribution of the groups. With the available information on these variables,
I compute the frictions faced by each group in each occupation.
1.5.1 Occupational distribution across groups
I define four groups for Brazil: white women, white men, brown men, and brown
women; and four groups for India: other men, other women, scheduled caste (SC) men,
and scheduled caste (SC) women. I assume that white men in Brazil and other men
in India face less frictions than other groups in these countries. This is a reasonable
assumption based on occupational distributions that I will show below. Later wage gap
estimations will also show that white men in Brazil and other men in India earn more
than other groups with similar characteristics. Figure 1.1 shows the share of each group in
highly skilled occupations8 in 2010 for Brazil and in 2004 in India. From the figure we see
that white men in Brazil and other men in India are more likely to work in highly skilled
occupations. The most disadvantaged groups in terms of shares in these occupations are
brown men and women in Brazil and other and scheduled caste women in India. All
these groups are less likely than the privileged group to work as executives, architects,
engineers, mathematicians, doctors, and lawyers.
8Highly skilled occupations are executives, architects, engineers, mathematicians, lawyers, and judges.
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Figure 1.1: Share of groups in highly skilled occupations
Here I show another way of looking at occupational distributions across groups.
I compute an index (Occupational similarity index9) that will show the similarity of
occupational distributions of groups with respect to white men in Brazil and other men
in India. The formula below captures the similarity in occupational distribution across
groups relative to the privileged group:
Ψg = 1− 12
N∑
i=1
|pi,wm−pi,g| (1.23)
Ψg is defined as the sum across occupations of the absolute value of the difference
in the propensity of group g relative to white men.10 The index shows the degree of
difference in occupational distribution between groups. An index value of zero implies
that the occupational distribution of the group is not similar to that of white men. A
detailed distribution of the index across groups is presented in Table 1.4. Panels A, B,
9I borrow the index from Hsieh et al. (2013).
10Other men in India
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and C present the occupational similarity index of the groups relative to the privileged
group in Brazil, India, and the US, respectively. The value of 0.32 for white women in
1991 indicates that the occupational distribution of white women is not similar to that of
white men. The value of 0.82 for brown men in 1991 shows that brown men were closer
to white men in occupational distribution. As can be seen from the table, there is a slight
increase in the index for all groups in Brazil. The index increased from 0.32, 0.82, and
0.28 in 1991 to 0.45, 0.85, and 0.37 in 2010 for white women, brown men and brown
women, respectively.
The occupational distribution analysis for India shows a slightly different picture
than for Brazil. We do not see as high an index value as for brown men in Brazil. The
closest in occupational distribution to other men in India is scheduled caste men with 0.77
in 1993 and 0.81 in 2004. The most disadvantaged in terms of occupational distribution
are other women, with the index of 0.33 in 1993 and 0.37 in 2004. Also the scheduled
caste women did not experience any convergence in occupational distribution relative to
other men, and their index value remained at 0.49.
Panel C of Table 1.4 shows occupational distribution of the groups relative to white
men in the US. We can see that, as in Brazil and India, women in the US have less similar
occupations than men. Women in the US have an occupational distribution closer to
that of white men than do women in other countries. Especially, it is seen in 2010, the
occupational similarity indexes for white and black women are 0.54 and 0.52 versus 0.45
and 0.37 for white and brown women in Brazil, and 0.37 and 0.49 for other and scheduled
caste women in India. Black men in the US are less likely to work in similar occupations
to those of the privileged group than are men in India and Brazil. In 2010 the similarity
index for black men in the US was 0.73, whereas the indexes for brown men in 2010 and
scheduled caste men in 2004 respectively were 0.85 and 0.81.
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Panel A: Relative to white men in Brazil
1991 2000 2010
white women 0.32 0.36 0.45
brown men 0.82 0.83 0.85
brown women 0.27 0.31 0.37
Panel B: Relative to other men in India
1993 1999 2004
other women 0.33 0.31 0.37
scheduled caste men 0.77 0.76 0.81
scheduled caste women 0.49 0.49 0.49
Panel C: Relative to white men in the US
1990 2000 2010
white women 0.48 0.53 0.54
black men 0.71 0.72 0.73
black women 0.44 0.5 0.52
Table 1.4: Occupational similarity index
1.5.2 Wage gap estimations
As we saw in the previous section, there is a difference in occupational distribution
between groups. Next, I examine if there are differences in wages between groups, their
magnitudes, and if they change over time. From the available data on wages across
occupations, I estimate the wage gaps of the groups relative to white men in Brazil and
to other men in India. The general functional form of log wages can be summarized by
the following equation:
log(wagei) = α+
∑
g β1gGig+β2Educi+β3Expi
+β4Exp2i +β5Exp3i +β6Exp4i +
∑
k β7kOik+ i
(1.24)
s
where
wage - wage per hour;
Gg - dummy representing groups;
Expi - experience;
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Educi - years of schooling;
Ok - dummy referring to occupations.
Table 1.5 reports group dummies estimated using the equation 1.24. The value of
-0.29 for white women in Brazil indicates that white women earned 0.29 log points less
than Brazilian white men in 1991. Brown women face the highest disadvantage relative
to white men in terms of wages, with a 0.51 log difference in 1991 and 0.46 in 2010. Wage
gaps for brown men were -0.22, -0.25, and -0.19 in 1991, 2000, and 2010, respectively.
During the 1991–2010 period white and brown women experienced 0.03 and 0.05 log
points wage convergence, respectively.
Panel B reports the estimations of wage gaps relative to other men for groups in
India. Wage gaps relative to other men faced by other women, scheduled caste men, and
scheduled caste women in 1993 were 0.34, 0.21, and 0.49 log points, respectively. There
was no noticeable change in wage gap over time.
Wage gaps of the groups relative to white men in the US show that women earn less
than men with similar characteristics. The wage gaps of the white women and black men
are closer to those of white women and brown men in Brazil. In 2010 white women and
black men earned 0.24 and 0.12 log points lower than white men, whereas white women
and brown men earned 0.26 and 0.19 log points lower than white men in Brazil. The
earnings of black women in the US are closer to those of white men than the earnings of
brown and scheduled caste women in Brazil and India, respectively.
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Panel A: Relative to white men in Brazil
1991 2000 2010
white women -0.29 -0.29 -0.260.006* 0.005 0.005
brown men -0.22 -0.25 -0.190.005 0.005 0.005
brown women -0.51 -0.50 -0.460.006 0.006 0.005
Panel B: Relative to other men in India
1993 1999 2004
other women -0.34 -0.33 -0.310.003 0.003 0.003
scheduled caste men -0.21 -0.19 -0.210.004 0.003 0.003
scheduled caste women -0.49 -0.49 -0.480.004 0.004 0.003
Panel C: Relative to white men in the US
1990 2000 2010
white women -0.32 -0.28 -0.240.005 0.005 0.005
black men -0.11 -0.13 -0.120.009 0.009 0.009
black women -0.28 -0.25 -0.260.009 0.008 0.008
*standard errors
Table 1.5: Conditional log difference in wages
The model predicts that wage gaps are the same for all occupations (1.16) and
independent of propensities. This means that changes in frictions faced by a group in
one occupation, resulting in a change of relative propensities, does not affect the average
wage of the group, because an increase (a decrease) of a friction will attract (deter) less
qualified workers, thus lowering (increasing) the average quality of the group. Table 1.6
shows the results of the regression of the occupational wage gap and relative propensities.
The regression was weighted by the share of the workers in the groups across occupations.
As can be seen from the table, the slope and the R2 from the regression of the wage
gap on propensities are small for all three countries, which is an indication that there is
little to no correlation between these variables, which supports the model version of the
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equation.
1991 2000 2010
slope st_dev R2 slope st_dev R2 slope st_dev R2
white women -0.021 0.020 0.016 -0.023 0.020 0.019 0.021 0.015 0.031
brown men 0.009 0.026 0.002 0.026 0.031 0.010 0.015 0.022 0.007
brown women -0.041 0.022 0.052 0.010 0.021 0.004 -0.003 0.019 0.000
(a) Brazil
1993 1999 2004
slope st_dev R2 slope st_dev R2 slope st_dev R2
other women -0.014 0.025 0.005 -0.035 0.018 0.059 -0.018 0.021 0.011
sc.caste men 0.059 0.036 0.040 0.008 0.034 0.001 -0.026 0.034 0.009
sc.caste women -0.014 0.028 0.004 -0.016 0.023 0.008 -0.030 0.026 0.019
(b) India
1990 2000 2010
slope st_dev R2 slope st_dev R2 slope st_dev R2
white women 0.005 0.024 0.001 -0.008 0.020 0.003 0.006 0.020 0.001
black men 0.032 0.034 0.065 0.036 0.026 0.066 0.007 0.021 0.002
black women 0.020 0.026 0.009 0.021 0.021 0.015 0.001 0.027 0.000
(c) USA
Table 1.6: Relationship of wage gaps and propensities
1.5.3 Estimation of Frictions
From the available data on the fraction of people in group g who work in occupation
i (pig) and the wage of group g relative to privileged group (w¯g/w¯g′ ), I can estimate the
relative frictions faced by groups in Brazil and India. So, by rearranging equation (1.17),
I arrive at the following estimate of the composite friction τˆig for each group in each
occupation:
τˆig =
τig
τiwm
(Tiwm
Tig
)
1
θ = ( pig
piwm
)−
1
θ ( w¯g
w¯wm
)−(1−η) (1.25)
τˆig is called a composite friction because it is a function of both relative friction
τig
τiwm
and relative mean talent (TiwmTig ). The composite friction will be high either because
22
the relative propensity of the group pigpiwm is low (the group is underrepresented in this
occupation) or the group faces a low wage gap w¯gw¯wm . The right-hand side of the equation
is observed in the data, so we can use it to determine τˆig faced by each group in each
occupation. The calculation of the friction by using the formula requires the estimates
of θ (the parameter that governs the dispersion of talent) and η (the elasticity of human
capital with respect to expenditure on human capital). I use the baseline parameter
estimates from Hsieh et al. (2013) and conduct robustness checks later. The baseline
parameter values are given in Table 1.7. With the baseline parameter value for θ equal
to 3.44, and baseline parameter value for η equal to 0.25, I compute composite frictions.
Parameter Value
Elasticity of substitution σ 3
Skill dispersion parameter θ 3.44
Elasticity of human capital η 0.25
Parameter in the utility β 0.693
Table 1.7: Baseline parameter values
Table 1.8 shows the estimates of the mean and standard deviation of τˆig faced by
the groups in all periods for Brazil, India, and the US. A value of the friction equal to
one means a group faces no frictions relative to a privileged group. If the value is more
than 1 then a group faces a friction, while a value less than 1 acts like a subsidy for that
group in that occupation.
In Brazil the highest frictions are faced by brown women, the average friction for
this group is 2.41 in 1991. The variance of frictions for the group is also the highest:
in 1991 the standard deviation was 1.13. Over twenty years, the friction experienced by
brown women in Brazil decreased: in 2010 the mean and standard deviation are 1.99 and
0.70, respectively. Of the three groups in Brazil, brown men face the least frictions. In
1991 the average friction for this group was 1.31, which only decreased by 0.10 to 1.20
in twenty years. The standard deviation of the frictions considerably decreased over the
period from 0.25 to 0.14. The variance of frictions faced by white and brown women
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shows that frictions for these groups are highly dispersed across occupations. As shown
by equation 1.17, dispersion of frictions across occupations causes misallocation of the
talent.
For India we see that the frictions are the highest for scheduled caste women and
other women. The average frictions are 2.24 and 2.79 in 1993, respectively for other and
scheduled caste women. In 2004 these decreased slightly to 2.09 and 2.64, respectively.
Scheduled caste women also face the higher dispersion of frictions than do other women.
The dispersion is 1.26 for scheduled caste women versus 0.80 for other women in 1993, and
these did not change much over the period. The lowest friction is faced by scheduled caste
men: the average friction for the group is 1.34 and 1.26, in 1993 and 2004, respectively.
The magnitude of frictions faced by the scheduled caste men in India is comparable to
the that of brown men in Brazil.
The frictions faced by the groups in the US are lower than those of the groups in
India and Brazil. The frictions faced by women are higher than the frictions faced by black
men. Black women face slightly higher frictions than do white women. The dispersion
of frictions for black women is also higher than that of white women. Overall, the table
shows that frictions are higher for women than for men in all three countries.
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1991 2000 2010
mean st_dev mean st_dev mean st_dev
white women 1.77 0.64 1.86 0.93 1.57 0.52
brown men 1.31 0.25 1.32 0.23 1.20 0.14
brown women 2.41 1.13 2.42 1.13 1.99 0.70
(a) Brazil
1993 1999 2004
mean st_dev mean st_dev mean st_dev
other women 2.24 0.80 2.29 1.10 2.09 0.73
sc. caste men 1.34 0.21 1.29 0.18 1.26 0.15
sc. caste women 2.79 1.26 2.54 0.95 2.64 1.33
(b) India
1990 2000 2010
mean st_dev mean st_dev mean st_dev
white women 1.55 0.58 1.46 0.52 1.45 0.53
black men 1.11 0.18 1.15 0.21 1.18 0.29
black women 1.62 0.85 1.53 0.76 1.59 0.73
(c) USA
Table 1.8: Summary stats of frictions across countries
1.6 Results
There are 8 exogenous parameters: Ai (technology by occupation), φi (elasticity of
human capital with respect to schooling), τig (frictions by occupation and group), qg (total
number of people by group), θ (the parameter that governs the dispersion of talent), η (the
elasticity of human capital with respect to expenditure on human capital), σ (elasticity
of substitution between occupations), and β (weight on consumption relative to time in
the utility function). The baseline values of some parameters are given in Table 1.7. I
check for robustness with different parameter values.
The number of people in each group qg is taken from the data. Assuming that
τhig captures the efficiency in human capital accumulation, I set h¯ig to one. I normalize
mean talent across groups for each occupation as Tig = 1. The normalization Tig = 1
assumes that there are differences in mean talent between men and women but that it is
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the same across occupations within groups. From the equation on average wage gaps and
equilibrium condition for schooling and matching the wage gap in the data I estimate φi
for each occupation. The technology parameter across occupations Ai is estimated from
equations 1.22, 1.20, and 1.21. Values for the price of efficiency units of human capital
wi are obtained by using equation 1.13 and matching to the data.
1.6.1 Model fit
Given these parameters I can compare the results produced by the model with
the data. In particular, I compare the model and data version of mean earnings and
occupational shares across groups and occupations. In the model, equation 1.13 produces
the occupational shares across groups and occupations and equation 1.15 produces mean
earnings across groups and occupations.
The model is calibrated to the occupational shares of white men in each period.
Table 1.9 compares the occupational shares produced by the model with the data for
the five occupational categories with the highest shares for each group. For example,
according to the data, the share of white men in Brazil working as farm non-managers is
0.102. The model counterpart of the data is also 0.102. For other groups in Brazil the
model produces close results. According to the data, 40.6% of white women and 49.7%
of brown women work in home sector. The model shows that 35.6% of white and 36.7%
of brown women work in home sector.
In India most men work as farm non-managers and most women work in the home
sector. The data shows that in 2004 33% of other men and 42% of scheduled caste
men were occupied in farming. The model versions of these shares are 33% and 40%,
respectively for other and scheduled caste men. In the same period 63.4% of other women
and 48.6% of scheduled caste women were occupied in home sector. The model predicts
that 61.5% of other women and 46% of scheduled caste women work in home.
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Data Model
white men
farm non-managers 0.102 0.102
construction 0.101 0.101
motor vehicl op. 0.096 0.096
sales 0.086 0.086
home 0.072 0.072
white women
home 0.406 0.356
sales 0.075 0.050
private occupations 0.067 0.098
teachers 0.060 0.061
farm non-managers 0.034 0.031
brown men
construction 0.148 0.154
farm non-managers 0.113 0.068
motor vehicle op. 0.089 0.109
related agriculture 0.087 0.085
home 0.065 0.043
brown women
home 0.497 0.367
private occupations 0.098 0.156
sales 0.057 0.037
teachers 0.047 0.051
cleaning 0.031 0.064
(a) Brazil
Data Model
other men
farm non-managers 0.330 0.330
sales 0.148 0.148
executives 0.050 0.050
construction 0.044 0.044
motor vehicle op. 0.040 0.040
other women
home 0.634 0.615
farm non-managers 0.219 0.225
teachers 0.022 0.022
sales 0.021 0.024
precision, textile 0.019 0.016
scheduled caste men
farm non-managers 0.422 0.400
sales 0.071 0.066
freight handler 0.067 0.062
construction 0.067 0.056
teachers 0.046 0.060
scheduled caste women
home 0.486 0.460
farm non-managers 0.354 0.351
sales 0.025 0.024
teachers 0.018 0.025
private occupations 0.016 0.004
(b) India
Table 1.9: Occupational shares in Brazil and India (data vs model)
Table 1.10 shows the results of regressing the earnings data on the model version of
earnings for each group and period in Brazil and India. For Brazilian white men in 1991,
a value of 1.551 indicates that a 1 percent increase in mean earnings of white men in 1991
produced by the model corresponds to a 1.551 percent increase in mean earnings given
by the data. Overall, the model produces less earnings than data. As can be seen from
the table in Brazil the model produces the highest fit for white men in 2010 with an R2
of 0.894. The lowest fit corresponds to the earnings of brown women in 1991 with an R2
of 0.550.
The mean earnings for India produced by the model fits better the data in terms
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of the slope than for Brazil. Overall, 1 percent increase in mean earnings produced by
the model corresponds to 0.8–1.15 percent increase in mean earnings given by the data.
However, the percentage of the variation in the the data that the model explains is lower
in India than in Brazil. The lowest fit belongs to scheduled caste women in 1991 with an
R2 of 0.230 and other men in 2004 an R2 of 0.669.
slope st.error R2
1991
white men 1.551 0.107 0.765
white women 1.412 0.149 0.585
brown men 1.613 0.117 0.747
brown women 1.532 0.176 0.550
2000
white men 1.623 0.080 0.864
white women 1.591 0.129 0.704
brown men 1.552 0.093 0.812
brown women 1.716 0.128 0.744
2010
white men 1.323 0.057 0.894
white women 1.418 0.063 0.886
brown men 1.299 0.058 0.885
brown women 1.440 0.081 0.831
(a) Brazil
slope st.error R2
1993
other men 0.884 0.105 0.524
other women 1.096 0.182 0.364
SC men 0.729 0.110 0.401
SC women 0.906 0.220 0.230
1999
other men 0.993 0.102 0.592
other women 1.150 0.165 0.441
SC men 0.926 0.117 0.496
SC women 1.098 0.196 0.346
2004
other men 0.983 0.086 0.669
other women 1.156 0.128 0.563
SC men 0.959 0.100 0.584
SC women 1.164 0.169 0.445
(b) India
Table 1.10: Mean earnings across groups in Brazil and India (data vs model)
1.6.2 Output gain
Since I have all the exogenous parameters, I can compute aggregate output from
the model. Then I can investigate how changing frictions affects the output. Since I have
data only for aggregate frictions τig =
(1+τhig)η
1−τwig , I can not separately identify the effects
from τwig and τhig. So, I do the analysis for two different cases: a case in which I allow
frictions only in acquisition of human capital τhig, and a case in which only frictions in the
labor market τwig are allowed.
I explore several counterfactuals. In a baseline case, I compute aggregate output in
each period by using estimated frictions of each period, setting frictions to one period,
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eliminating all frictions, and using US frictions. Earlier I showed frictions faced by the
groups in US. In this section I check if replacing frictions faced by the groups in Brazil
and India with those of the US affects the aggregate productivity in these countries. In a
robustness check section, I test the counterfactual output gain due to zero frictions with
different parameter values.
Counterfactual output gain in Brazil
Table 1.11 presents output gain in Brazil with various frictions. The top panel of
the table shows output gain due to frictions in the labor market and the bottom panel
shows output gain due to frictions in accumulation of human capital. The output gain is
higher if frictions were replaced by the 2010 frictions in Brazil as shown in the first row of
the table. In the case of frictions in the labor market if the 1991 and 2000 frictions were
replaced by the 2010 frictions, the output would increase by 9.4% and 4.4%, respectively.
The second row shows the gain with the US frictions in 2010. The gains are 20.8%, 13.7%
and 11.1%. From the previous sections, I showed that the 2010 frictions in Brazil are
lower than in other periods, and that the frictions in the US are also lower than those
in Brazil in corresponding periods. Thus, the analysis shows that output increases with
the reduction of frictions. The last two rows show the counterfactual output gain from
halving the frictions in corresponding years and removing them. Halving the frictions
faced by the groups across occupations increases the output by 15.4%, 10.7%, and 9.3%.
Removing them entirely increases the output even more by 42%, 31.1%, and 27.5%.11
Output gain due to acquisition of human capital shows a similar pattern in output gain,
but the gain is lower than with frictions due to the labor market.The gain increases both
with τwig and τhig cases. In the τhig case eliminating frictions has a smaller effect compared
to the τwig case.
11Hsieh et al. (2013) has output gain of 14.3% in 2008 for the US if frictions were reduced to zero.
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Frictions in labour market
1991 2000 2010
Brazil 2010 friction 9.4% 4.4% 0.0%
US 2010 friction 20.8% 13.7% 11.1%
Frictions halved 15.4% 10.7% 9.3%
No friction 42.0% 31.1% 27.5%
Human capital frictions
Brazil 2010 friction 12.9% 10.2% 0.0%
US 2010 friction 20.6% 14.8% 5.9%
Frictions halved 20.2% 17.3% 11.4%
No friction 35.5% 28.2% 21.4%
Table 1.11: Counterfactuals: Output gain in Brazil
Counterfactual output gain in India
For India I first show the results of the model with the limited number of caste
categories but detailed occupational categories. Then I investigate if results change with
more detailed caste categories but broader occupational categories. I do this because the
data size is small with detailed caste and detailed occupation categories. So there is a
trade-off between the number of caste categories and the number of occupation categories.
Broader caste categories. Table 1.12 presents counterfactuals output gain in India
due to labor market frictions (τwig) on the top and frictions in human capital (τhig) on
the bottom panel. The following four cases are investigated: output gain if frictions
were replaced by 2004 Indian frictions, gain with US 2010 frictions, gain if frictions were
halved, and gain if frictions were removed. Replacing the 1993 and 1999 frictions in India
with 2004 frictions increases production in 1993 and 1999 by 4% and 2.7%, respectively,
meaning that frictions in 2004 were slightly less than in 1993 and 1999. If frictions faced
by the groups were replaced by those of the groups in the US in 2010 the output would
increase by 23.6%, 22.5%, and 19.9%, respectively in 1993, 1999, and 2004. Cutting
frictions to half in all groups across all occupations increases the output even more, by
17.1%, 14.9%, and 14.1% in the corresponding years. We observe higher gains than in
Brazil when frictions are reduced to zero. Removing all frictions increases aggregate
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output by 45.9% in 1993 and by 44.2% and 41.2% in 1999 and 2004. The model predicts
that output increases with reducing frictions. The gain increases both with τhig and τwig
cases. In the τhig case eliminating frictions has a smaller effect compared to the τwig case.
Frictions in labour market
1993 1999 2004
Indian 2004 friction 4.0% 2.7% 0.0%
US 2010 friction 23.6% 22.5% 19.9%
Frictions halved 17.1% 14.9% 14.1%
No friction 45.9% 44.2% 41.2%
Human capital frictions
Indian 2004 friction 5.6% 4.9% 0.0%
US 2010 friction 21.2% 22.9% 19.6%
Frictions halved 22.4% 22.3% 19.8%
No friction 39.4% 40.0% 36.1%
Table 1.12: Counterfactuals: Output gain in India
Detailed caste categories. Here I show the results generated by using detailed caste
categories. The categories available for all periods are “other”, “scheduled tribe”, and
“scheduled caste”. I use only 19 broad occupation categories as opposed to the 67 occupa-
tion codes used in the previous analysis. The broader categories are aggregated by using
67 occupations. These 19 occupation categories are shown in Appendix Table A2.
Table 1.12 shows the effect of reducing frictions faced by different groups on aggre-
gate production in India. The column headings refer to the number of caste categories.
The column 2 shows the output gain with 3 caste categories and column 3 shows the
output gain with 2 caste categories. As can been seen from the table the output gain
is close in both cases. The counterfactual output gain from removing all frictions with
detailed castes increases the aggregate output by 34%, 31.1%, and 28.7% in 1993, 1999,
and 2004, respectively. The counterfactual output gain from removing all frictions with
broad castes increases the aggregate output by 33.6%, 30.9%, and 28% in 1993, 1999, and
2004, respectively.
The gain due to removing frictions in the case of τhig is also substantial. In the case of
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detailed caste categories removing frictions in all occupations faced by the groups results
in increase of the output by 33.9%, 31.7%, and 28.9% in 1993, 1999, and 2004, respectively.
The counterfactual gain in the case of broad caste categories is also significant: the output
goes up by 33.1%, 31.1%, and 27.9% in the respective years.
more castes less castes
due to labor market
1993 34.0% 33.6%
1999 31.1% 30.9%
2004 28.7% 28.0%
due to human capital
1993 33.9% 33.1%
1999 31.7% 31.1%
2004 28.9% 27.9%
Table 1.13: Counterfactuals: Output gain in India with detailed caste categories
Gains in Brazil vs. India
The output gains from reducing frictions are larger in India than in Brazil. According
to the model, there are three forces that vary across countries and that affect output gains
from removing frictions: occupational shares, wage gaps, and population shares. Here I
investigate which of these three forces is most important for larger gains in India than
in Brazil. To do that I compute output in India by replacing each of the three items
in India with that of Brazil. Then I compare counterfactual output gains in India by
removing frictions. Table 1.14 shows the results in the case of frictions in labor market
and friction in human capital, respectively. The first row shows the baseline case with
occupational shares, wage gaps and population shares in India where the gain in output
is due to removing frictions.
The second row of Table 1.14 illustrates how changes in wage gaps in India affect
the output of the country. This is a counterfactual in which wage gaps of the groups in
India are replaced by the wage gaps of the groups in Brazil. The effects of changing the
wage gaps in the case of frictions in human capital and in the labor market are similar
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in all years. This indicates that wage gaps faced by the groups in Brazil and India are
similar in corresponding years.
The third row of the table shows the counterfactual gain if the Indian population
shares were replaced by Brazilian population shares. That is, the population shares of the
four groups in each period in India are replaced with the population shares of the four
groups in Brazil in corresponding periods, holding everything else fixed. This will produce
the output gain from removing frictions in the case of frictions in labor market of 53.5%,
52.7%, and 52.2%, and in case of frictions in human capital of 44%, 45.8%, and 43% in
1993, 1999, and 2004, respectively. The gain is larger with Brazilian population shares
than with Indian population shares. This is not surprising since the share of disadvantaged
groups in India is smaller than the share of disadvantaged groups in Brazil, and reducing
frictions for groups with larger population share will have a larger effect on output.
The last row shows the productivity effects of replacing the occupational shares in
India with the occupational shares in Brazil, holding everything else fixed. Removing
frictions will result in 34.7%, 31.1%, and 28.6% increase in output in the case of the
frictions in labor market and in 27%, 25.7%, and 15.8% increase in output in the case
of the frictions in human capital, in corresponding years. The gains are smaller with
Brazilian occupational shares than with Indian occupational shares. This shows that in
India the groups are misallocated more than the groups in Brazil.
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1993 1999 2004
Baseline 45.9% 44.2% 41.2%
with Brazilian wage gaps 45.9% 44.6% 41.7%
with Brazilian population shares 53.5% 52.7% 52.2%
with Brazilian occupational shares 34.7% 31.1% 28.6%
(a) Frictions in the labor market
1993 1999 2004
Baseline 39.4% 40.0% 36.1%
with Brazilian wage gaps 39.4% 40.1% 36.3%
with Brazilian population shares 44.0% 45.8% 43.0%
with Brazilian occupational shares 27.0% 25.7% 15.8%
(b) Frictions due to human capital
Table 1.14: Counterfactual output growth in India
1.6.3 Robustness analysis
In this section, I test the previous results for robustness. I compute the output gain
with different values of θ, η, and σ. The exercise is done separately by allowing frictions
in the labor market and in the acquisition of human capital. The results in Table 1.15
and Table 1.16 show the gain in output in 2010 for Brazil and in 2004 for India when all
frictions are removed.
The first row of Table 1.15 shows the output gain in Brazil due to removing frictions
with changing η, holding other parameters constant. As can be seen, the results with
changing η are robust. The gain does not change much with changing σ, except for
σ = 15. The change in gain from the baseline case when σ = 15 is 4–6%. With changing
θ, the difference from the baseline case is the highest when θ = 8.4.
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Frictions due to labor market
η = 0.25 η = 0.15 η = 0.5 η = 0.1
changing η 27.5% 27.5% 27.5% 27.5%
σ = 3 σ = 4.5 σ = 15 σ = 2.75
changing σ 27.5% 29.8% 32.8% 26.9%
θ = 3.44 θ = 4.16 θ = 5.6 θ = 8.4
changing θ 27.5% 27.5% 27.5% 27.5%
Frictions due to human capital
η = 0.25 η = 0.15 η = 0.5 η = 0.1
changing η 21.4% 19.3% 27.4% 18.3%
σ = 3 σ = 4.5 σ = 15 σ = 2.75
changing σ 21.4% 23.0% 25.1% 20.9%
θ = 3.44 θ = 4.16 θ = 5.6 θ = 8.4
changing θ 21.4% 20.1% 18.4% 16.4%
Table 1.15: Output gain in Brazil due to removed frictions
The results in Table 1.16 display the gain in output in 2004 with changing parameters
in India. For the case with friction in the labor market, changing η does not change the
gain in output relative to the baseline case. With changing σ, the output varies from the
baseline by 20% when σ = 15. Varying θ shows no difference from the baseline gain.
The pattern of output gain in the case of frictions in human capital acquisition is
different from frictions in the labor market. The gain differs from the baseline by 4–5%
when η = 0.5, by 10–11% when σ = 15 and by 1–3% with different values of θ.
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Frictions due to labor market
η = 0.25 η = 0.15 η = 0.5 η = 0.1
changing η 41.2% 41.2% 41.2% 41.2%
σ = 3 σ = 4.5 σ = 15 σ = 2.75
changing σ 41.2% 43.2% 21.3% 40.5%
θ = 3.44 θ = 4.16 θ = 5.6 θ = 8.4
changing θ 41.2% 41.2% 41.2% 41.2%
Frictions due to human capital
η = 0.25 η = 0.15 η = 0.5 η = 0.1
changing η 36.1% 34.6% 40.6% 33.8%
σ = 3 σ = 4.5 σ = 15 σ = 2.75
changing σ 36.1% 37.2% 22.9% 35.8%
θ = 3.44 θ = 4.16 θ = 5.6 θ = 8.4
changing θ 36.1% 35.6% 34.7% 33.3%
Table 1.16: Output gain in India due to removed frictions
1.7 Conclusion
The purpose of the paper was to investigate the labor market outcomes in Brazil
and India and document their effects on aggregate productivity. I showed that there
are disadvantaged groups in Brazil and India. The share of groups other than white
men in Brazil and other men in India in highly skilled occupations is low. Only 1–2 %
of brown men and women in Brazil, and 1% of women in India are occupied in highly
skilled occupations. The wage gap between groups and the privileged group in these
countries is also significant. The earnings of brown women in Brazil and scheduled caste
women in India are 48–50% lower and than the earnings of privileged men with similar
characteristics.
The effect of the resulting occupational choice from frictions in the labor market
and in the acquisition of human capital is significantly negative. The augmented Roy
model used by Hsieh et al. (2013) allowed me to estimate the potential gains to output
from reducing frictions in human capital accumulation and the labor market. Reducing
frictions faced by various groups in Brazil and India increases the aggregate productivity
of the countries. In particular, the results suggest that reducing frictions to half may
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increase output by 9–20% in Brazil and by 14–22% in India. Removing frictions increases
the aggregate productivity of the countries by 21–42% in Brazil and 36–45% in India.
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Chapter 2
IMMIGRANT CHARACTERISTICS IN LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES
2.1 Introduction
The analysis of immigrants in developed countries has shown that labor market out-
comes of immigrants and natives differ. Immigrants experience occupational downgrading
on arrival, work in lower-paid occupations and earn less than natives with similar experi-
ence and schooling. Over time, the earnings gap between immigrants and natives closes.
Immigrants experience occupational upgrading as they adjust to the host country labor
market. The initial disadvantage in the labor market outcomes between immigrants and
natives diminishes.
Studies have explained the differences in earnings between immigrants and natives
by the differences in human capital endowments that immigrants from different coun-
tries possess (Hendricks (2002), Schoellman (2012), Lagacos et al. (2017), Hendricks and
Schoellman (2018)). Others have proposed that the difference in earnings is due to the
skill loss experienced by immigrants when moving from the source to the host country
(Chiswick (1978, 1979, 1980), Duleep and Regets (1997, 1999, 2002)). To distinguish
between these two causes of earnings difference, I investigate immigrants in low-income
countries for whom skill transfer is likely to be less of a problem. Since lower earnings of
immigrants are explained by the lack of transferable skills, I assume that immigrants in
low-income countries do not face skill loss since they are occupied in higher-paid occupa-
tions and their earnings are higher than those of natives. The additional evidence that
immigrants in low-income countries do not experience a skill loss in low-income countries
is that the share of college-educated migrants in high-skill occupations is higher than that
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of non-migrant workers in the source countries.
To test if the difference in immigrants’ earnings is due to the human capital en-
dowments of immigrants from different countries, I follow Hendricks (2002). His findings
suggest that the unobserved human capital of immigrants does not vary as much as the in-
come per capita of the source countries. A possible explanation of this is that immigrants
from poor countries are more positively selected than immigrants from rich countries. In
particular, the studies have shown that immigrants are positively selected on education
and that the selection is higher for immigrants from low-income countries (e.g. Schoellman
(2012) and Hendricks and Schoellman (2018)). A more positive selection of poor country
immigrants results in higher unobserved skills than those of workers in the source country.
Thus, the self-selection of immigrants in developed countries drives a wedge between the
human-capital endowments of immigrants and source country workers. The analysis in
low-income countries shows that immigrants are selected much less on schooling and that
the differential selection of immigrants is less than in developed countries, which suggests
that the variation in immigrant earnings should be higher in low-income countries than
in developed countries.
The disadvantage in the labor market outcomes between immigrants and natives
closes over time. The labor market adjustment of immigrants to the host country labor
market in developed countries is shown by the closing of the gap in earnings and the
gap in occupational distribution between immigrants and natives. Chiswick (1978, 1979,
1980) documents that immigrants adjust to the environment by investing in host-country-
specific skills, which leads to faster growth of their earnings relative to natives. Duleep
and Regets (1997, 1999, 2002) explain the adjustment by the accumulation of human
capital. The opportunity cost of investing in human capital is lower for immigrants than
for natives in developed countries. Thus, immigrants accumulate more human capital
than natives. In low-income countries, immigrants are paid more and are in better-
paid occupations than natives. Then, due to the higher opportunity cost of investing
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in human capital, immigrants should accumulate less human capital than natives with
similar characteristics.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate empirically whether the difference in
immigrant earnings in low-income countries is due to the difference in human capital en-
dowments and to investigate if low-earning natives accumulate more human capital than
immigrants. I investigate immigrants in low-income countries by using census data from
Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela. The analysis shows that, although immigrants are pos-
itively selected on education, they are closer to the source country workers in terms of
attained education levels than immigrants in developed countries. The relationship be-
tween the average schooling years of migrants and non-migrants shows that the selection
of immigrants from poor countries is not as high as the studies in developed countries
show. This result in low-income countries translates to larger differences in the unobserved
human capital of immigrants. By using immigrant earnings, I estimate the unobserved
human capital of immigrants. The analysis of immigrant earnings in low-income countries
indicates that the variation of unobserved human capital of immigrants is larger than find-
ings in developed countries show. In particular, the slope that describes the relationship
between immigrant unobserved human capital and the source country income is 0.31–0.37
in low-income countries, whereas in the US it is 0.14. This result supports the findings
of Hendricks and Schoellman (2018) that differences in human capital across immigrants
are large.
I also show that immigrants in low-income countries earn more and are in better-paid
occupations than natives. The analysis of immigrants in Brazil indicates that the earn-
ings gap between immigrants and natives closes over time and that natives upgrade their
occupations relative to immigrants. The initial earnings of the 1980–1990 and 1990–2000
arrival cohorts were 30% and 40% higher than natives with similar characteristics, respec-
tively. Over time, the earnings gap between 1980–1990 and 1990–2000 arrival cohorts and
natives has decreased to 26% and 31%, respectively. The wage gain from changing occu-
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pational distribution relative to natives for immigrants with high school degrees or less
is -0.74% and -6.6%, and for college-educated immigrants is -1.13% and -6.09% after 10
and 20 years of stay in Brazil, respectively. This shows that natives in Brazil accumulate
more human capital than immigrants, which supports the findings in developed countries
that lower-earning groups accumulate more human capital.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the literature, Section 2.3
describes the census data obtained from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series,
Section 2.4 examines if the difference in earnings is due to human capital or skill transfer-
ability, Section 2.5 discusses the selection of immigrants and compares the characteristics
of migrants and non-migrants, Section 2.6 provides empirical evidence on unobserved
skill differences of immigrants, Section 2.7 describes the findings related to assimilation
of immigrants, and Section 2.8 concludes.
2.2 Literature review
Studies in developed countries have shown that immigrant earnings are lower than
those of natives with comparable characteristics and that immigrants are occupied in
lower-paid occupations. Duleep and Dowhan (2002), by analyzing immigrants in the US,
found that 1965–1969 arrival cohorts earned 17% and cohorts who immigrated after 1969
earned 28–46% less than natives with similar observable characteristics. Antecol et al.
(2003) document that recent immigrants in Australia, Canada, and the USA earn 5.3%,
43.8% and 52.9% lower than natives, respectively. Winkelmann (2005) shows that im-
migrant earnings in New Zealand are 20–25% lower than those of natives. Immigrants
work in lower-paid occupations relative to natives with similar characteristics. Dustman
et al. (2014) point out that recent immigrants in the UK work in lower-paid occupations
although they are better educated than the overall population. Zorlu (2013), by investi-
gating immigrants in the Netherlands, documents that Turkish and Moroccan immigrants
are in jobs at the lower levels of skill distribution.
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2.2.1 Immigrant earnings and human capital
Hendricks (2002) has proposed that immigrant earnings reflect the human capital
endowments of the source countries. This comes from the fact that immigrants migrate
with the source country human capital and face similar skill prices in the host country
labor market. Given observable characteristics, immigrant unobserved skills relative to
natives are derived from their earnings. His findings suggest that the unobserved human
capital of immigrants does not vary as much as the income per capita of the source coun-
tries, meaning that there is not much difference between the unobserved human capital
of the immigrants from poor countries and that of the immigrants from rich countries. A
possible explanation of this is that immigrants from poor countries are more positively
selected than immigrants from rich countries.
Human capital across immigrants also differs by the quality of the source country
schooling. Schoellman (2012) estimates the quality of schooling for countries by analyz-
ing the return to schooling of immigrants in the US. He shows that immigrants from
developed countries have higher return to schooling than do immigrants from developing
countries. He documents the importance of the measure of education quality estimated
from immigrant earnings in accounting for cross-country income differences. Taking into
account country differences in education quality increases the contribution of schooling in
cross-country income differences by 10% to 20%.
Another measure of unobserved human capital differences across countries is pro-
posed by Lagacos et al. (2017). They investigate the differences in returns to experience
for immigrants from different countries. The paper finds that returns to experience accu-
mulated in the source countries are higher for immigrants from developed countries than
for immigrants from developing countries. By building the model of life-cycle human
capital accumulation, Lagacos et al. point out that immigrants from poor countries accu-
mulate less human capital in the source countries than do immigrants from rich countries.
By using the New Immigrant Survey (NIS), Hendricks and Schoellman (2018) inves-
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tigate wage gains from migration for immigrants in the US. The NIS data allow control
of the selection and skill transferability of immigrants by observing the wages of work-
ers in the source as well as in the host country. Wage gains experienced by immigrants
after migration are assumed to come from host-country-specific factors such as physical
capital and Total Factor Productivity (TFP), and the remaining part from the human
capital of the workers. By estimating the human capital of immigrants from different
countries, the paper documents that human capital accounts for 60% of cross-country
income differences.
2.2.2 Skill transferability
An alternative explanation of the earnings disadvantage of immigrants relative to
natives is that immigrants cannot transfer their skills to the host country labor market
and they lack host-country-specific skills. The studies assume that immigrants cannot
fully utilize the source-country human capital due to lack of specific skills. Immigrants
lack knowledge about the host country job opportunities, have less occupation-specific
training, and they also lack host-country-specific credentials, such as diplomas or licenses
specific to the host country labor market. To increase the value of their source country
human capital, immigrants learn languages and attend trainings.
Chiswick (1978, 1979, 1980) pointed out that earnings of immigrants are depressed
initially because immigrants experience a skill loss in the host country labor market. Im-
migrants have different levels of skill transferability because of the differences in the source
and host countries’ cultural and economic environments, languages, returns to schooling
and experience. He theorized that low-skill-transferability immigrants will experience
lower initial earnings than high-skill-transferability immigrants and natives.
According to Duleep and Regets (1997, 1999, 2002), immigrants from developed
countries have higher earnings than other immigrants because they have higher transfer-
able skills due to similarity in economic opportunities in the source and the host countries.
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Only migrants with high transferable skills in developed countries migrate because work-
ers with low transferable skills do not have the incentive to migrate due to the higher
opportunity cost of investing in source-country-specific skills. Workers from developing
countries have higher incentives to migrate and invest in host-country-specific skills due
to having lower opportunity cost of investing in human capital.
Other studies assign a secondary role to skill transferability in explaining the labor
market outcome of immigrants. It is important to take into account immigrants’ skill
transferability, because imperfect skill transfer leads to the understatement of the source
country human capital endowments. By observing the same worker in two labor markets,
Hendricks and Schoellman (2018) analyzed if immigrants were able to transfer their skills
to the host country. Their findings suggest that immigrants experience imperfect skill
transferability due to the occupational downgrading when they move from the source
country to the host country. Lagacos et al. (2017) also show that immigrants in the US
face imperfect skill transferability by analyzing the share of college-educated workers in
high-skill occupations. They find that the share of college-educated immigrants in the
US in high-skill occupations is lower than the share of college-educated non-migrants in
those occupations in the source countries.
2.2.3 Assimilation
After spending some time in the host country, immigrants catch up with natives
in terms of earnings and occupations. Chiswick (1978, 1979, 1980) proposed that im-
migrants lack host-country-specific skills when they initially arrive. Then immigrants
acquire required host country skills and become more adapted to the host country labor
market, which leads to faster growth of their earnings relative to natives. He measured
immigrant earnings growth by using a single cross-sectional data set. He compared the
earnings of recently arrived immigrants to the earnings of immigrants with similar observ-
able characteristics who had been in the country longer. Duleep and Regets (1999, 2002)
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modified Chiswick’s model by adding the opportunity cost of investing in human capital.
Low-skill-transferability immigrants experience faster earnings growth than natives and
high-skill-transferability immigrants due to their lower opportunity cost of investing in
human capital. This leads to higher growth of earnings for immigrants relative to na-
tives and the moving to better-paid occupations, thus closing the earnings gap relative to
natives.
Many other studies have investigated immigrant assimilation by adopting varying
methodologies. Cohort differences in observable and unobservable characteristics have
been found to be important in investigating immigrant assimilation. Estimation of earn-
ings growth by taking into account cohort-specific characteristics (Borjas (1985, 1987,
1992)) has shown that entry earnings of immigrants differ by the years of immigration.
The other important question in studying immigrant assimilation is the role of the source
country human capital in immigrants’ adjustment to the host country labor market. The
studies have pointed out the importance of distinguishing between the education and
the experience obtained in source and in host countries (e.g. Friedberg (2000), Schoeni
(1997), Bratsberg and Ragan (2002), Akresh (2006, 2007), Cohen-Goldner and Eckstein
(2008) and Lagakos et al. (2017)). The findings suggest that education and labor mar-
ket experience obtained in different countries are not perfect substitutes, the return to
immigrants’ schooling and experience is generally less than that of natives, or human
capital obtained in developed countries is more valuable than human capital obtained in
low-income countries.
Assimilation of immigrants to the host country labor market in terms of occupa-
tional mobility was also investigated by many researchers. Studies found evidence that
immigrants initially downgrade then, after accumulating human capital, upgrade their oc-
cupations. The studies use two types of data, longitudinal and cross-sectional. The studies
using longitudinal data (Chiswick et al. (2005), Akresh (2006), Hendricks and Schoellman
(2018)) have found that most of the immigrants experience occupational downgrading and
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move to higher-paid occupations after spending time in the host country. The studies us-
ing cross-sectional data (Green (1999), Barrett and Duffy (2007), Mattoo et al. (2008),
Chiswick and Miller (2008, 2009), Dustman et al. (2014), Zorlu (2013, 2016)) have found
similar evidence about the occupational mobility of immigrants. The occupational distri-
bution of recently arrived immigrants resembles the distribution of relatively uneducated
natives: immigrants start working at lower-paid jobs, then, with the duration in the
host country, their occupational distribution improves and they move to higher-paid jobs.
Thus, immigrants are more occupationally mobile than natives.
2.3 Data
The analysis uses census data from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series
(IPUMS) for the following countries and periods: USA (1970, 1980, 1990, 2000), Brazil
(1980, 1991, 2000, 2010), Venezuela (1981, 1990, 2001), and Mexico (1970, 1990, 2000,
2010). The variable names, coding schemes, and documentation are consistent for most
samples, which makes the analysis more comparable across periods and countries. This
section explains the data used in the paper, and issues related to the consistency of the
certain variables across sample periods and countries.
The data are analyzed for the sample periods that have key variables. For example,
the Brazilian census has key variables available for the following years: 1991, 2000, and
2010. The following restrictions are made to the data: 1) the analysis is restricted to
individuals whose ages are between 20 and 65, 2) individuals who are on active military
duty and unemployed individuals are excluded, 3) observations with missing income are
excluded, and 4) immigrant source countries with fewer than 100 observations for the US
and 50 observations for other countries are dropped.
Table 2.1 provides information on the number of observations after imposing the
restrictions in Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela. Brazilian data show that the number of
immigrants in the samples dropped from 12,369 in 1991 to 7,612 in 2010. The analysis of
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the information on the internet does not indicate that the Brazilian government imposed
restrictions on immigrants, which shows that the decline is not associated with any change
in immigration policy. In fact, Villen (2017) provides data that show a large increase in
working visas during this period. According to his study, the number of immigrant workers
increased from 5,376 in 1993 to 14,741 in 2000, and to 55,471 in 2010.
The number of immigrants in the sample in Mexico increased from 4,333 in 1990 to
5,405 in 2010. The data also show that the number of immigrants in Venezuela constitutes
a substantial part of the overall population of the country: 51,037 immigrants versus
275,984 and 49,021 immigrants versus 515,826 of the total working population for the
samples in 1981 and 2001, respectively. Most of the immigrants in Venezuela are from
Colombia and constitute a half of the total immigrant population in the sample. The
large-scale Colombian immigration can be explained by the long border and the Colombian
conflict since 1980.
Brazil
Survey year 1991 2000 2010
Number of observations 2,045,386 2,448,835 3,349,398
Number of immigrants 12,369 10,304 7,612
Mexico
Survey year 1990 2000 2010
Number of observations 1,290,567 1,536,279 1,713,270
Number of immigrants 4,333 4,910 5,405
Venezuela
Survey year 1981 1990 2001
Number of observations 275,984 331,398 515,826
Number of immigrants 51,037 42,752 49,021
Immigrants from Colombia 23,368 26,614 27,348
Table 2.1: Sample data
Some variables that IPUMS provides are harmonized across countries and some are
not. Harmonized variables that I use are edattaind, age, incearn, sex, empstat, hrswork,
bplcountry and yrimm. Emptat indicates a person’s employment status, which I use
to identify employed individuals. Incearn reports the individual’s total income in the
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previous month or year, expressed in the currency of the respective country. Hrswork
shows a person’s hours worked per week, which is used to compute hourly wages. Hrswork
is not available for some surveys. Bplcountry shows the respondent’s country of birth.
It allows me to identify immigrants in the sample and their source countries. Year of
immigration is captured by yrimm, which is available only for Brazil and the US. A
person’s educational attainment, identified by variable “edattaind,” shows the person’s
educational attainment in terms of the level of schooling completed. Table 2.2 gives
the detailed coding of the variable, from which I construct a variable that indicates a
person’s number of schooling years completed, the third column of Table 2.2. There is a
limitation in constructing years of schooling from edattaind because it will show only the
approximate number of years of schooling. For example, there is a discontinuity between
8 and 12 years of schooling, and it also will not allow me to identify individuals with more
than 16 years of schooling.
Code Label Schooling years
Less than primary completed
110 No schooling 0
120 Some primary 2
130 Primary (4 years) 4
Primary completed, less than secondary
211 Primary (5 years) 5
212 Primary (6 years) 6
Lower secondary completed
221 General and unspecified track 7
222 Technical track 8
Secondary completed
311 General track completed 12
312 Some college/university 13
320 Technical track 13
321 Secondary technical degree 13
322 Post-secondary technical education 13
400 University completed 16
Table 2.2: IPUMS Educational attainment
From the available data I construct hourly wages, experience, and a variable that
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identifies immigrant cohort. I construct hourly wages from monthly earnings and hours
worked per week. Cohorts of immigrants in Brazil are identified by migration years.
Experience is constructed from the individual’s age and years of schooling completed as
age minus schooling minus 6. As I discussed previously, there is a problem with recording
years of schooling correctly for some observations, which leads to a difficulty in recording
the potential experience for some observations. It may overstate the actual potential
experience if actual years of schooling is higher and understate if the actual years of
schooling is lower.
Table 2.3 summarizes the key variables in the sample by providing their means,
standard deviations, and minimum and maximum values. Mean age and mean years of
schooling have increased over time for all countries. The difference in mean earnings
between 1990 and 2000 in Mexico and Brazil is related to the currency revaluations
conducted by the corresponding countries, Mexico in 1993 and Brazil in 1994.
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mean sd min max
1991
age 35.8 11.2 20.0 65.0
educ 5.37 4.63 0.0 16.0
lwage 11.0 1.1 1.1 16.8
2000
age 36.6 11.2 20.0 65.0
educ 6.36 4.65 0.0 16.0
lwage 5.8 1.0 0.0 13.5
2010
age 37.9 11.6 20.0 65.0
educ 7.7 4.88 0.0 16.0
lwage 6.6 0.9 0.0 14.4
(a) Brazil
mean sd min max
1990
age 35.9 12.2 20.0 65.0
educ 5.59 4.5 0.0 16.0
lwage 13.0 1.3 0.0 18.3
2000
age 36.8 12.3 20.0 65.0
educ 5.9 4.54 0.0 16.0
lwage 7.6 0.9 0.7 13.8
2010
age 38.0 12.5 20.0 65.0
educ 6.42 4.42 0.0 16.0
lwage 8.2 0.9 0.0 13.8
(b) Mexico
mean sd min max
1981
age 34.9 11.2 20.0 65.0
educ 5.95 3.9 0.0 16.0
lwage 7.6 0.8 0.7 14.4
1990
age 35.7 11.2 20.0 65.0
educ 5.55 4.3 0.0 16.0
lwage 8.7 0.8 0.7 11.5
2001
age 36.8 10.8 20.0 65.0
educ 7.89 4.0 0.0 16.0
lwage 6.0 1.1 0.0 12.9
(c) Venezuela
Table 2.3: Sample data
The analysis also uses the data on occupations, which are available from IPUMS.
These indicate an individual’s primary occupation, classified according to the system used
by the respective census of each country. Country surveys have different classification
systems for occupations. Moreover, the Brazilian survey has varying classifications for
different periods. To make data comparable across years and countries, I harmonize the
occupational coding to the 1990 census occupational classification system used by Hsieh
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et al. (2013) and aggregate to 19 occupations.1 The aggregation of the occupations to the
broader category is done by merging related occupational categories. For instance, exec-
utive, administrative, and managerial occupations are merged into one broader category
as management-related occupation.
Section 2.5 about the selection of immigrants compares the education levels of mi-
grants and non-migrants. The data on the education of non-migrant populations are taken
from Barro and Lee (2013). The data set provides educational attainment information
for 146 countries from 1950 to 2010. The data are disaggregated by sex and by five-year
age intervals. The advantage of the data set is that it has information on average years of
schooling for countries which are analyzed in the paper. I compare years of schooling of
the population aged 25 and over in 2000 for Venezuela2 and in 2010 for other countries.
I also use the Penn world table database (PWT version 8.1). The database contains
information on countries’ relative income levels and populations, covering most of the
countries analyzed in this paper. It is used to compare source country GDP per capita
to the human capital of immigrants. The GDP per capita of a country is computed by
dividing real GDP at chained PPPs to the population of the country.
2.4 Human capital vs skill transferability
Studies have explained the differences in earnings across immigrants and natives by
the differences in human capital endowments that immigrants from different countries
possess. Immigrants from developed countries have higher unobserved human capital,
higher returns to schooling, and higher returns to experience than those coming from
developing countries. Alternative interpretations of the difference in earnings between
immigrants and natives are that immigrants cannot fully transfer their skills or that
they lack host-country-specific skills. Immigrants from developing countries have lower
1The detailed occupational coding is provided in the Appendix.
2Venezuela has immigrant data only up to 2001.
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transferable skills than immigrants from developed countries. Only workers with high
transferable skills migrate from developed countries since workers with low transferable
skills do not have an incentive to migrate due to having a higher opportunity cost of
investing in host-country-specific skills.
To distinguish between two interpretations of earnings difference across immigrants,
I investigate immigrants in low-income countries for whom skill transfer is less likely to
be a problem. Since studies explain lower initial earnings of immigrants as due to their
initially lacking transferable skills, I assume that immigrants in low-income countries do
not face skills loss because they work in higher-paid occupations and their earnings are
higher than those of natives. The share of immigrants in high-skilled occupations also
shows that immigrants in low-income countries experience less skills loss than immigrants
in high-income countries. By following Lagacos et al. (2017), I compute the shares of
college-educated migrant and non-migrant workers in high skilled occupations.3 Figure
2.1 compares the frequencies of working in high-skilled jobs by migrants and non-migrants.
Thus, if the share of college-educated migrants working in high-skill occupations is lower
(higher) than those of non-migrants with similar characteristics in the source countries,
then migrants experience (do not experience) a skills loss. As can be seen from the figure,
most of the immigrants in the US experience a skills loss, as shown by the lower share of
college-educated migrants in high-skill occupations than non-migrants. In Brazil, most of
the immigrants do not experience a skills loss.
Another way to see it is to look at the average share of immigrants working in high-
skilled occupations. In Brazil, the average share is 0.84, meaning that college-educated
immigrants in Brazil tend to work at high-skill occupations at a higher frequency than
those in the US. It is clear that immigrants in the US are less likely to work at high-skill
occupations.
3High-skill occupations are defined as professionals, technicians, associate professionals, legislators,
senior officials and managers.
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Figure 2.1: The share of college-educated workers in high-skilled occupations
2.5 Selection
Immigrants are a selected group of the source country populations. Theoretical
studies suggest that immigrants are negatively selected if they are from poor and unequal
countries (Borjas (1987)). Others document positive selection due to higher migration
costs faced by lower-educated immigrants (Chiquiar and Hanson (2005)). Host country
networks also play a role in self-selection by reducing costs and increasing returns to
migration ((Orrenius and Zavodny (2005), McKenzie and Rapoport, (2010)).
Empirical studies in the US have documented that immigrants are positively selected
based on education (e.g. Schoellman (2012), Hendricks and Schoellman (2018), Lagacos
et al. (2017)). Schoellman (2012) hypothesized that if immigrants are positively selected
on education then they must be positively selected on cognitive ability, which suggests
that they are more productive than non-migrants. A recent study by Hendricks and
Schoellman (2018) using longitudinal data of immigrants in the US provides evidence
that immigrants are highly selected on characteristics such as education and wages, and
that immigrants from poor countries are selected much more on these characteristics.
To investigate if immigrants in low-income countries represent a selected group of the
source country population, I construct a measure of selection that compares education
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levels of migrants and non-migrants of the various source countries. This measure of
selection will show if there is a difference in characteristics between migrants and non-
migrants. Then I compare immigrants in various host countries to find out if the measure
of selection varies across different host countries.
Migrants are considered to be selected on education if the average education level
of migrants differs from the average education level of non-migrants. In particular, if
the level of education of immigrants is higher than that of non-migrants then there is a
positive selection on education; if it is lower then there is a negative selection on education.
To construct average years of schooling of immigrants, I use an educational attainment
variable which is available in the censuses of the respective countries from IPUMS. The
data provide an information on respondents’ education level and country of birth. By
using information on years of schooling and country of birth, I construct weighted average
years of schooling for the source countries, which is then defined as the average years of
schooling of migrants. Average years of schooling of non-migrants are taken from the
Barro-Lee data set. The data set contains information on the educational attainment of
the populations of many countries by five-year age groups. For each country I construct
average years of schooling for the population aged between 25 and 65 by weighting the
schooling of each age group by the corresponding share of the group. Next I compare the
resulting average years of schooling of immigrants in the host countries and average years
of schooling of non-migrants in the source countries.
Figure 2.2 compares the average years of schooling of migrants and non-migrants
in 2000. The vertical and the horizontal axes represent average years of schooling of
migrants and non-migrants, respectively. From the plot for the US, we see that data
points lie above the 45 degree line, meaning that immigrants in the US are more educated
than non-migrants. We also see that the level of selection increases for poor countries.
The selection on education is the highest for immigrants from India, as shown by the large
distance from the 45 degree line. This supports findings in other studies documenting that
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immigrants in the US are positively selected on education and that the degree of positive
selection increases for poor countries. Schoellman (2011) documents that immigrants in
the US are positively selected on years of schooling and that the selection is highest for
immigrants from Afghanistan, Nepal, Sierra Leone, and Sudan, who have 10 to 12 years
of schooling difference from non-migrants.
Figure 2.2 also compares the education levels of migrants in Brazil, Mexico, and
Venezuela to those of the non-migrants. The analysis shows that immigrants are positively
selected but the degree of selection is lower than in the US. This is clearly seen for
Brazil and Venezuela, as the data points lie around the 45 degree line. We still see that
immigrants from poor countries are positively selected, but the degree of positive selection
is not as strong as in the US. The main takeaways from the analysis are that immigrants
from poor countries in the US are selected by a factor of 3-4, while immigrants in other
countries are selected by a factor of 2-3. All immigrants from rich countries in the US are
positively selected. This is not true for all immigrants from rich countries in other host
countries. Some immigrants are positively selected and some are negatively selected on
education.
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Figure 2.2: Education levels of immigrants vs non-migrants
The relationship between the educational attainment of migrants and that of non-
migrants is also shown by the regression line and the slope in Figure 2.2. The regression
was adjusted by the source country weights. The slopes of the lines describe the rela-
tionship between immigrant and non-migrant schooling and show how steep it is. The
higher slope indicates that selection on education is closer between source countries. For
example, the slope of 0.26 in the US is the lowest among four countries, meaning that
“low school” countries are more selected on education than “high school” countries. The
highest slope belongs to Venezuela, which indicates that immigrants from “high school”
and “low school” countries are equally selected.
This section explored the question of immigrant selection in different host countries.
The main takeaway from this section is that selection on education is higher for immigrants
in the US than in other host countries.
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2.6 Unobserved skill differences
Immigrant earnings are positively related to source country incomes. Immigrants
from developed countries earn more than immigrants from developing countries given ob-
servable characteristics. Thus, immigrant earnings convey some information about the
development of source countries. This observation has encouraged many studies to inves-
tigate labor market outcomes of immigrants in host countries. Studies that investigate
immigrant earnings and their occupations have documented that immigrants differ in
unobserved skills, return to schooling and experience accumulated in source countries.
To estimate the unobservable skills differences of immigrants, I follow Hendricks
(2002). The idea is to compare the estimated unobserved skills of immigrants with the
source country income. First, wage regression is estimated on the native sample by in-
cluding controls on observable characteristics. The earnings for given characteristics of
immigrants are predicted using the estimates of the regression, then the residual earnings
are computed by subtracting the predicted earnings from the observed earnings. The
resulting value is the residual earnings of immigrants relative to natives. Given observ-
able characteristics, the residual earnings show the difference in the unobserved skills of
immigrants.
The procedure of estimating residual immigrant earnings relative to natives uses the
following regression equation:
ynit = αn+βssnit+βaDnit+µnt + it (2.1)
where:
ynit - wage per hour;
snit - schooling years;
Dnit - a dummy variable that represents the following age groups (15–20, 21–25, ...
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66+);
µnt - time effect.
A superscript n on the variables means that the equation is estimated using only
natives. Assuming that the return to education, age and time are the same for immigrants
and natives, I compute predicted earnings from the above equation for all individuals in
a sample. Then, by subtracting the predicted earnings from the actual earnings, I get
residual earnings. Given individual residual earnings, I compute mean residual earnings
by the source country from which the immigrants originate.
The resulting country-specific residual earnings are plotted in Figure 2.3. The figure
plots residual immigrant earnings relative to natives on the y-axis and source country GDP
per capita on the x-axis. The points on the figure represent the source country relative to
the US. The residual earnings are plotted against relative per capita GDP of countries in
2000.4 For example, the residual earnings of immigrants from Japan are on average 20%
higher than the residual earnings of natives in the US, and GDP per capita is 30% lower
than GDP per capita of the US. There are two takeaways from the graph. First, the skills
differences of immigrants in the US have a positive relationship with earnings per capita.
Second, residual earnings for most immigrants are below 0, meaning that the unobserved
skills of most of the immigrants are below those of natives, which is not surprising since
immigrants in the US come from countries where income is lower than in the US.
I compute residual earnings for immigrants in Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela by
using census data5 for the countries. Figure 2.3 plots the earnings gap of immigrants in
these countries relative to per capita income of the source countries. We see that earnings
vary positively with GDP per capita in all host countries. The other takeaway from these
plots is that immigrant earnings are higher than the earnings of natives. For example,
4If I measure source country GDP in the year before migration, I get the same results. The reason is
that the slope between the weighted GDP per capita and GDP per capita in 1990 and 2000 is 0.96 and
0.90, respectively.
5Data from the following censuses are used: Brazil (1991, 2000, 2010), Mexico (1990, 2000, 2010) and
Venezuela (1981, 1990, 2001).
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the residual earnings of immigrants from Korea in Brazil are 80% higher and the residual
earnings of immigrants from Argentina in Mexico are 60% higher than those of natives,
given observable characteristics. Only the earnings of immigrants from Guatemala in
Mexico and immigrants from Colombia and Grenada in Venezuela are equal to or lower
than the earnings of natives in the respective host countries.
Figure 2.3: Earnings gap of immigrants relative to natives
If immigrants represent a random group of the source country population, then the
estimated unobserved human capital of the immigrants measure the unobserved human
capital of the source country worker. A positive selection in characteristics that increase
the productivity of immigrants will result in higher unobserved skills than those of workers
in the source country. As shown in Figure 2.2, immigrants in the US are positively selected
on education, and the selection is higher for immigrants from low-income countries. A
more positive selection of low-income country immigrants results in unobserved skills
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higher than those of workers in the source country. Figure 2.3 suggests that the unobserved
human capital of immigrants estimated from immigrant earnings does not vary as much as
the income per capita of the source countries. The slope of 0.14 in the US indicates that
a 1% increase in relative income is associated with a 0.14% increase in relative residual
skills.
In low-income countries, immigrants are much less selected on schooling and the
differential selection of immigrants is less than in the US, which should result in larger
differences in the unobserved human capital of immigrants. The slopes in the figure indi-
cate that the gap in unobserved human capital across immigrants in low-income countries
is larger than in the US. A 1% change in source country income is associated with a
0.31%, 0.39%, and 0.33% change in residual earnings of immigrants in Brazil, Mexico,
and Venezuela, respectively. The high variation in immigrant earnings in low-income
countries permits the assumption that the difference in human capital endowments across
countries is much larger. This result supports the findings of Hendricks and Schoellman
(2018).
2.7 Assimilation
Earnings between immigrants and natives converge over time. Duleep and Regets
(1999 and 2002) have explained the convergence of earnings by different rates of earnings
growth due to different rates of human capital accumulation. Immigrants from a develop-
ing country arriving at a developed country accumulate human capital more due to the
lower opportunity cost of investing in human capital.
In this section I will investigate immigrant earnings growth relative to natives in
low-income countries. In sub-section 2.7.1 I provide some theoretical background on the
human capital investment model. In sub-section 2.7.2 I proceed with empirical analysis
that shows the relative growth of immigrants’ earnings in low-income countries. In sub-
section 2.7.3 I analyze the occupational distribution of immigrants and investigate if
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immigrant earnings growth is accompanied by change in occupational distribution.
2.7.1 Human capital investment model
This section briefly describes the two-period human capital investment model de-
veloped by Ben-Porath.
Individual maximizes the following discounted two-period model:
max
i
wt(1− it)ht+ e−rtwt+1[ht(1− δ)+(htit)α] (2.2)
where it is the investment at time t, ht is the stock of human capital at time t, δ is
the depreciation rate of human capital and α is the rate of return to investment. The
solution of the problem returns the following identity that relates investment to the stock
of human capital:
it = (
wt+1
wte−rtα
)
1
α−1 1
ht
(2.3)
The model predicts that investment decreases with ht. Thus immigrants in devel-
oped countries due to having lower skills relative to natives invest more in human capital
than do natives. In studying immigrant earnings growth in the US, Duleep and Regets
documented that immigrants have lower initial earnings, but higher earnings growth than
natives. Immigrants coming to developed countries with low initial earnings have lower
opportunity costs of investing in human capital than natives. Then immigrants accumu-
late more human capital than natives, which makes their earnings grow faster than those
of natives.
2.7.2 Empirical analysis
Here I check if the results of the empirical analysis match the predictions of the
human capital investment model. To investigate immigrant earnings in Brazil, I follow
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Duleep et al. (2014). I estimate the following wage equation on data that pool immigrants
and natives:
yit = βXit+ θsit+βExpExpit+βExp
2
Exp2it
+βimim+(θimsit+βimExpExpit+βimExp
2
Exp2it)× im+ it
(2.4)
where:
im - immigrant indicator;
Xit - observable characteristics other than education and experience;
sit - years of schooling;
Expit - total potential experience;
The interaction of experience and schooling with immigrant dummy allows the
estimation of a country-specific return to schooling (θ+ θim ) and a country-specific
return to experience (βExp + βExp2 + βimExp + βimExp2). I estimate the above equa-
tions separately for each census and for each year-of-entry cohort that can be followed
from the immigrants’ initial years in the host country. I define as,expit = βim + θimsi
+βimExpExpit+βimExp
2
Exp2it as the mean log earnings gap of the immigrant i in year
t with schooling sit and experience Expit relative to the native with similar observable
characteristics. The changing of this earnings gap over time will show the earnings growth
of immigrants relative to natives.
The wage equation 2.4 was first estimated for the cohort of immigrants aged 25–45
who entered the host country during the ten6 years prior to a census. Then, using the
censuses that were conducted after 10 and 20 years, I estimate the same equation for the
same cohort but aged 35–55 and 45–65, respectively. I estimate the wage equation on
samples from the US and Brazil. Figures 2.4 and 2.5 display entry earnings and growth of
earnings for immigrants with average years of schooling in the US and Brazil, respectively.
As shown in Figure 2.4, immigrants in the US initially earn lower than natives. The initial
6For the US I use cohort of immigrants that entered the US during the five years prior to census.
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earnings of immigrants who arrived in 1975–1980 are 27% lower than those of comparable
natives, and the gap shrinks over time to 5%. A similar pattern of assimilation is observed
for immigrants who arrived in 1985–1990. Immigrants on arrival earned 25% less than
natives with similar characteristics and the gap had decreased to 14%. This result is in
line with the studies in developed countries that document higher earnings growth for
immigrants than natives.
Figure 2.4: Assimilation of immigrants in the US
Using the 1990, 2000, and 2010 Brazilian census and equation 2.4 I estimate cross-
sectional regression to investigate the earnings growth for immigrants and natives in
Brazil. Figure 2.5 shows immigrant earnings relative to those of natives. Initial earnings of
both immigrant cohorts are higher than those of the natives. The 1980–1991 arrival cohort
with average years of schooling earn 30% more than natives with similar characteristics.
After twenty years the earnings, gap between immigrants and natives has shrunk by 4%
to 26%, meaning that the earnings growth of natives was higher than the earnings growth
of immigrants. The relative earnings path of the 1990–2000 arrival cohort shows a similar
trend. Immigrants initially earned 40% more than comparable natives and the gap had
decreased to 31% over time. Thus, immigrants in Brazil earn more than natives, but
the gap closes over time. This observation in Brazil supports the accumulation of human
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capital hypothesis: natives experience higher earnings growth than immigrants due to
having a lower opportunity cost of investing in human capital.
Figure 2.5: Assimilation of immigrants in Brazil
Selective out-migration can bias the results. The studies in developed countries
document that the least skilled out-migrate at higher rates (e.g. Lubotsky (2007)). I check
if there is a selective out-migration of immigrants in observables in Brazil by analyzing
the change in average schooling and the fraction of highly educated immigrants as a
given cohort stays in the country. Dividing the immigrant cohorts in the population by
schooling, I compute the average years of schooling and the fraction of highly educated
workers over time. Highly educated workers are defined as individuals with more than 12
years of schooling. The measures of education level of immigrant cohorts were adjusted
by the source country weights.
In Appendix, Figure A1 compares the education of immigrant cohorts in Brazil.
Average years of schooling of 1980–1990 arrival cohorts didn’t change much with years
of stay in Brazil, 12.12, 11.85, 12, respectively in 1990, 2000, and 2010. The fraction
of highly educated 1980–1990 arrival cohorts slightly increased over time, 47%, 48%,
and 50% in 1990, 2000, and 2010, respectively. Average years of schooling of 1990–2000
arrival cohorts slightly increased with years since migration, but not by much, 12.23 and
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12.39 years of schooling in 2000 and 2010, respectively. The fraction of highly educated
1990–2000 arrival cohorts also increased over time, 55% in 2000 and 56% in 2010. A
small increase in the average years of schooling for 1990-2000 cohorts and increase in the
fraction of highly educated immigrants for both cohorts suggests the out-migration of
lower educated immigrants. This would likely bias results in favor of higher wage growth
for 1990-2000 arrival cohorts relative to natives in Brazil.
2.7.3 Occupational distribution and mobility of immigrants
In the previous section I showed that the gap in earnings between immigrants and
natives closes over time. In the US, immigrants initially earn less than natives and over
time immigrant earnings grow faster than those of natives. In Brazil, immigrants earn
more than natives and the gap in earnings closes due to the higher growth of earnings
of natives. Does the occupational distribution of immigrants also converge to that of
natives? The studies in developed countries document that immigrants initially experience
occupational downgrading, then over time they upgrade their occupations, meaning that
they move to higher-paid occupations. This observation in developed countries supports
the human capital accumulation model that immigrants with low opportunity cost of
investing in human capital accumulate more human capital than natives. In this section
I investigate if immigrants in low-income countries experience occupational mobility.
This section analyzes if the occupational distributions of immigrants and natives
differ. Does the occupational distribution of immigrants change over time? I analyze the
occupational distribution of immigrants relative to natives in the US and Brazil, Mexico
and Venezuela. Then I conduct some counterfactual experiments that help me compare
the occupational distribution of immigrants over time.
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Occupational ranking
To compare the occupational distribution of immigrants and natives, I rank oc-
cupations. Following Hendricks and Schoellman (2018), I rank occupations by mean
occupational earnings.7 Mean occupational earnings are estimated from the following
specification:
yni = αn+βnXni +
∑
j
ωjD
n
ji+ i (2.5)
where Xn is a vector of observable characteristics such as education, experience, sex,
regional dummies, and marital status and Dnji is a dummy representing occupation j for
individual i. From the above regression I estimate ωj - occupational dummies, which is
used to sort occupations.
Occupational distribution
Now that I have a ranking of occupations, I can compare the occupational distribu-
tions of immigrants and natives. First I divide the sample into four age groups: 20–29,
30–39, 40–49 and 50+, and two education groups: individuals with high school degrees
or less and individuals with college degrees. For each education and age cell I calculate
occupational distributions across occupations for immigrants and natives pimi and pni . I
sort the occupations based on the occupational dummies estimated above and construct
the cumulative densities for different groups of immigrants and natives.
Figure 2.6 plots the densities for immigrants and natives aged 30–40 with high
school and college degrees. The horizontal axis represents sorted occupations and the
vertical axis represents cumulative density based on these occupations. The analysis of
the occupational distributions of workers in the US shows that immigrants with high
7Chiswick et al. (2005), Chiswick and Miller (2008) and Akresh (2006) used the International Socio-
Economic Index of Occupational Status (ISEI), which allows determination of the status of occupations.
It is derived from the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) by using data on
education, occupation, and income.
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school degrees or less are concentrated in lower-paid occupations than natives with sim-
ilar characteristics. Immigrants and natives with college degrees have close occupational
distributions, which are concentrated in higher-paid occupations. In Brazil, Mexico, and
Venezuela we see a different picture. In these countries, the distribution of immigrants in
both groups first-order stochastically dominates the distribution of natives, meaning that
immigrants work in higher-paid occupations than natives. There is a larger difference
in occupational distribution between immigrants and natives with high school degrees or
less than between college-educated immigrants and natives. Natives with college degrees
are closer in occupational distribution to immigrants with comparable characteristics.
(a) USA (b) Brazil
(c) Mexico (d) Venezuela
Figure 2.6: Occupational distribution of immigrants
69
Occupational mobility
I showed that occupational distributions of immigrants and natives differ. Here I
investigate if occupational distributions of immigrants relative to natives change over time.
The studies in developed countries have documented that immigrants gradually upgrade
their occupations relative to natives after accumulating human capital and investing in
the host-country-specific skills. Do immigrants in low-income countries upgrade their
occupations after arrival? To answer this question I conduct an experiment where I
quantify the overall gain from the occupational distribution.
I compare occupational distributions of immigrants on arrival with the occupational
distributions of the same cohort after some period in the host country. I estimate the
change in mean occupational earnings between the two groups. The change in occu-
pational mean earnings has two components: a change in composition and a change in
distribution. I am interested in a change in distribution. To separate these effects I use
the Oaxaca decomposition method:
∑
c
wc,t+1yc,t+1−
∑
c
wc,tyc,t =
∑
c
(wc,t+1−wc,t)∗yc,t+1+
∑
c
(yc,t+1−yc,t)∗wc,t (2.6)
where yc,t is the mean log earnings relative to natives of the immigrant from country c in
time t, and wc,t is the share of immigrants from country c in time t, which is available from
the data. Mean log relative immigrant earnings yc,t is estimated from the occupational
earnings relative to natives in the following way:
yc,t =
∑
j
(wc,j,t−wn,j,t)∗yj,t (2.7)
where wc,j,t is the share of immigrants from country c in occupation j in time t, and yj,t
is the earnings in occupation j estimated from equation 2.5.
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∑
cwc,t+1yc,t+1−
∑
cwc,tyc,t is the overall gain of an immigrant from staying in a
host country for one more period, ∑c(wc,t+1−wc,t)∗yc,t is the component of the gain due
to a change in country compositions and ∑c(yc,t+1− yc,t) ∗wc,t is the component of the
gain due to a change in the occupational distribution of immigrants. I am interested in
the second component of the gain.
The computed gain in earnings which summarizes the difference in occupational
distributions of immigrants is plotted in Figure 2.7. The wage gain for immigrants in
the US that comes from changing the occupational distribution shows that immigrants
in both education groups experienced occupational upgrading after arrival. The analysis
of 1975–1980 arrivals shows that immigrants with a high school degree or less have an
increase in wages: 2.14% and 1.72% increase after 10 and 20 years of stay in a host
country, respectively. The same cohort of college-educated immigrants also experienced
an occupational upgrading: 2.13% and 3.02% increase in average wages after 10 and
20 years of stay in a host country, respectively. This shows that after some time the
occupational distribution of immigrants shifts towards higher-paid occupations.
The analysis of the occupational mobility of immigrants in Brazil shows a different
picture. Figure 2.7 shows the gain in wages from changing the occupational distribu-
tion of immigrants in Brazil. Immigrants with high school degrees and college-educated
immigrants experienced an occupational downgrading relative to natives, meaning that
natives with similar characteristics move to higher-paid occupations. The counterfactual
wage gain from changing the occupational distribution for immigrants with a high school
degree or less is -0.74% and -6.6% after 10 and 20 years of stay in a host country, re-
spectively. The counterfactual wage gain from changing occupational distributions for
college-educated immigrants is -1.13% and -6.09% after 10 and 20 years of stay in a host
country, respectively.
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(a) USA (b) Brazil
Figure 2.7: Relative wage gain from changing the occupational distribution of immigrants
2.8 Conclusion
I estimate residual immigrant earnings for Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela. I show
that earnings of immigrants are steeper in low-income countries than in the US. One of
the explanations of this is that immigrants in these countries are less selected on education
than immigrants in the US. Investigation of selection on education in Brazil and Venezuela
shows that the level of selection does not change with source countries.
Given the earnings gap between immigrants and natives, I investigate if the gap
closes over time. Analysis of immigrants in Brazil shows that immigrants start with
higher earnings relative to natives and that the gap between natives closes over the period.
The occupational distribution of immigrants in Brazil shows that immigrants work in
higher-paid occupations relative to natives. After spending some time in the host country
immigrants in Brazil downgrade their occupations relative to natives. This result in low-
income countries is consistent with the predictions of the human capital accumulation
model: low-earning groups accumulate more human capital than high-earning groups.
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s APPENDIX
Code Occupations names Code Occupations names Code Occupations names
1 Executives, Administrative
and Managerial
23 Information clerks 45 Electronic repairer
2 Management related 24 Records processing,
non-financial
46 Misc. Repairer
3 Architects 25 Records processing, financial 47 Construction
4 Engineers 26 Office machine operator 48 Extractive
5 Math and Computer science 27 Computer and communication
equipment operator
49 Precision Production,
Supervisor
6 Natural science 28 Mail distribution 50 Precision Metal
7 Health Diagnosing 29 Scheduling and distributing
clerks
51 Precision Wood
8 Health Assessment 30 Adjusters and Investigators 52 Precision Textile
9 Therapists 31 Misc. Administrative support 53 Precision other
10 Teachers, Postsecondary 32 Private household occupations 54 Precision, food
11 Teachers, Non-Postsecondary 33 Firefighting 55 Plant and System
12 Librarians and curators 34 Police 56 Metal and Plastic Machine
Operator
13 Social scientists and Urban
planners
35 Guards 57 Metal and Plastic Processing
Operator
14 Social, Recreation and
religious workers
36 Food preparation and service 58 Woodworking machine
operator
15 Lawyers and Judges 37 Health service 59 Textile machine operator
16 Arts and Athletes 38 Cleaning and building service 60 Printing machine operator
17 Health technicians 39 Personal service 61 Machine machine operator
18 Engineering technicians 40 Farm managers 62 Fabricators
19 Science technicians 41 Farm non-managers 63 Production inspectors
20 Technicians, other 42 Related agriculture 64 Motor Vehicle Operator
21 Sales 43 Forest, fishers and hunters 65 Non-Motor Vehicle Operator
22 Secretaries 44 Vehicle mechanic 66 Freight and material handlers
Table A1: Occupational coding
Table A1 reports information on aggregated categories and their coding. Categories
were aggregated on analyzing the IPUMS 1990 Census Bureau occupational classification
scheme and Hsieh et al. (2013) data available on authors webpage.
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Aggre-
gated
code
Broader occupational
categories
Disaggregated
code
1 Executives, administrative, and
managerial
1, 2, 40
2 Architects, engineers, lawyers 3, 4, 15
3 Math, and computer science 5, 6, 13
4 Nurses, therapists, and other
health service
7, 8, 9, 37
5 Technicians 17, 18, 19, 20
6 Teachers 10, 11
7 Recreation, religious, arts,
athletes
12, 14, 16
8 Administrative support, clerks,
record keepers
22, 23, 24, 25,
26, 27, 28, 29,
30, 31
9 Food, cleaning, and personal
services and private household
32, 38, 39
10 Fire, police, and guards 33, 34, 35
11 Food prep. 36, 54
12 Farm, related agriculture,
logging
41, 42, 43
13 Mechanics 44, 45, 46
14 Construction and extraction 47, 48
15 Precision manufacturing 49, 50, 51, 52,
53
16 Manufacturing operators 55, 56, 57, 58,
59, 60, 61, 62,
63
17 Vehicle operators 64, 65, 66
18 Sales 21
19 Home 67
Table A2: Broader occupational categories
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year variable N.obs. mean sd min max
1991
age
964173
37.0 10.0 23.0 60
educ 5.0 4.5 0.0 16
hours 43.1 10.8 1.0 100
exper 26.0 11.8 1.0 54
lwage* 11.1 1.1 4.1 16.6
2000
age
1204520
38.5 10.3 23.0 60
educ 5.9 4.6 0.0 16
hours 43.4 12.8 1.0 100
exper 26.6 12.0 1.0 54
lwage 5.9 1.0 0.0 12.6
2010
age
1530715
39.2 10.6 23.0 60
educ 7.3 5.0 0.0 16
hours 40.8 12.2 1.0 100
exper 25.9 12.7 1.0 54
lwage 6.7 0.9 0.0 13.3
*lwage defines log of earnings
(a) Brazil
year variable N.obs. mean sd min max
1993
age
244197
36.3 11.1 20.0 60
educ 4.6 5.3 0.0 16
exper 25.7 12.9 0.0 54
lwage 5.3 1.1 0.0 10.0
1999
age
256537
36.4 11.0 20.0 60
educ 5.2 5.5 0.0 16
exper 25.1 12.9 0.0 54
lwage 6.0 1.0 2.3 12.6
2004
age
268612
36.7 11.0 20.0 60
educ 5.5 5.4 0.0 16
exper 25.2 13.0 0.0 54
lwage 6.2 1.0 2.3 11.8
*lwage defines log of earnings
(b) India
Table A3: Summary statistics
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1991 2000 2010
All 5.5% 6.3% 10.4%
white men 8.5% 8.7% 12.1%
white women 7.7% 9.4% 17.1%
brown men 1.8% 1.8% 3.8%
brown women 1.9% 2.3% 6.8%
(a) Brazil
1993 1999 2004
All 6.8% 8.1% 7.8%
Other men 11.5% 13.0% 12.3%
Other women 5.5% 7.0% 6.4%
Scheduled tribe men 3.5% 4.7% 7.0%
Scheduled tribe women 1.2% 1.9% 2.4%
Scheduled caste men 2.5% 3.9% 5.1%
Scheduled caste women 0.5% 1.3% 1.8%
(b) India
Table A4: Share of college-educated
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1991 2000 2010
in labor force:
employed, not specified 684,648 0 0
at work 0 802,335 1,051,513
have job, not at work 0 35,591 43,666
not in labor force:
inactive 0 366,792 435,902
housework 285,185 0 0
unable to work, disability 8,569 0 0
in school 8,843 0 0
living on rents 2,891 0 0
retired 33,416 0 0
pensioner 14,662 0 0
Total 1,038,214 1,204,718 1,531,081
(a) Brazil
1993 1999 2004
in labor force:
at work 164,079 169,877 183,889
have job, not at work 2,186 2,753 2,123
not in labor force:
housework 77,793 83,779 81,583
permanent disability 1,184 1,563 2,020
temporary illness 439 464 416
in school 6,588 7,589 7,941
retirees and living on rents 1,154 1,566 1,987
Total 253,423 267,591 279,959
(b) India
Table A5: Activity status
Table A6 and A7 report results of regression of log wage on group dummies and
other explanatory variables for Brazil and India. Regression is run separately for each
year.
81
1991 2000 2010
white women -0.313 -0.283 -0.2550.006 0.005 0.005
brown men -0.225 -0.252 -0.1780.005 0.005 0.005
brown women -0.519 -0.481 -0.4410.006 0.006 0.005
schooling 0.106 0.102 0.080.001 0 0
experience 0.047 0.043 0.0340.001 0.001 0.001
experience^2 -0.001 -0.001 00 0 0
(Intercept) 5.515 0.306 1.2820.015 0.013 0.013
occup. Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 141099 169064 209953
R-squared: 0.51 0.51 0.4
F-test 2025.44 2445.2 1946.39
*Dependent variable is log wages
Table A6: Regression results for Brazil
1993 1999 2004
other women -0.336 -0.329 -0.3110.003 0.003 0.003
sch. caste men -0.209 -0.192 -0.2090.004 0.003 0.003
sch. caste women -0.492 -0.489 -0.4830.004 0.004 0.003
schooling 0.076 0.078 0.0790 0 0
experience 0.021 0.023 0.0260 0 0
experience^2 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.00010 0 0
(Intercept) 6.181 6.901 7.090.01 0.009
occup. Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 216540 226560 242580
R-squared: 0.67 0.75 0.74
F-test 6117.76 9197.53 9758.43
*Dependent variable is log wages
Table A7: Regression results for India
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code Names of occupational
categories
1 Executives, Administrative, and
Managerial
2 Architects, Engineers, Lawyers
3 Math, and Computer Science
4 Nurses, Therapists, and Other
Health Service
5 Technicians
6 Teachers
7 Recreation, Religious, Arts,
Athletes
8 Administrative Support, Clerks,
Record Keepers
9 Food, Cleaning, and Personal
Services and Private Household
10 Fire, Police, and Guards
11 Food prep.
12 Farm, Related Agriculture
13 Mechanics
14 Construction and extraction
15 Precision Manufacturing
16 Manufacturing Operators
17 Vehicle Operators
18 Sales
19 Home
Table A8: Occupational categories
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1980-1990 1990-2000
im 0.746 0.220.18 0.136
educ_a 0.139 0.130.002 0.002
educ_im 0.001 0.0240.008 0.006
exper 0.09 0.070.005 0.004
exp_2 -0.002 -0.0010 0
exp_im -0.069 -0.0190.018 0.015
expim_2 0.002 0.0010.001 0
(Intercept) 9.241 3.9190.067 0.056
Regional Dummies Yes Yes
Number of observations 9529 11164
R-squared: 0.4 0.41
F-test 575.46 707.66
*Dependent variable is log wages
Table A9: Regression results (Brazil)
(a) Average years of schooling (b) Fraction of highly educated immigrants
Figure A1: Schooling of immigrants over time
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